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ABSTRACT

In the last century, Argentina faced an astonishing economic downturn that remains until today,
frustrating all who learn its economic history, explore the country's potential, and stay in tune with
its political-economic present. This research examines Argentina's economic history, revises the
main drivers that signed its economic drama, and proposes guidelines to address new opportunities
by encouraging its private sector. By using Vista Oil and Gas as an exemplary case, this work
proposes Vista's business model as an initiative perfectly compatible with the primary
macroeconomic needs that Argentina currently has that should be highly considered for developing
its private sector. Furthermore, the paper explains how Argentina could restructure its engagement
with private enterprises and studies the main mistakes and lessons from the Argentine economic
policy and the new perspectives under the current global context.
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PREFACE

The study is primarily concerned with the economic development of Argentina, its society, and
how to find a better path for policymaking and priorities in its economic organization. In this
research, the historical framework is centered on the last twenty years, and there is little or no
reference to previous economic history that has a very relevant impact on today’s present. This
topic has been developed in the writer’s independent study: ‘The Economic History of The
Argentine Republic from 1929 to 1989.’ That worked as a historical framework for this thesis. The
writer hopes to continue his investigation on these other topics and to recognize what are the best
ways to approach economic opportunities in Argentina.

This study was aided along its way by many friends and mentors. First and foremost was Professor
Peter DeShazo, who was a part of the project since the idea incubation and guided the work through
its many stages and revisions and under whose supervision it was presented to the MALS office at
Dartmouth. Professor Bruce Sacerdote and Professor Douglas A. Irwin read draft versions and
commented on feedback with so many important suggestions. Silvia Carrasco helped with edition
and communication ideas.

To all of these, the author is deeply grateful for ready aid and cooperation. Needless to say, errors
of commission and omission are entirely his own.

Emiliano Cabrera

New York, NY.
August 14, 2020
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INTRODUCTION: WHY ARGENTINA, WHY VISTA?

In economic history and political economy fields, Argentina has stood out as a particular case of a
country with remarkable opportunities and constant frustrations to achieve sustainable economic
development. One of the most significant midcentury economists, Simon Kuznets, said, 'There are
four kinds of countries: developed countries, underdeveloped countries, Japan, and Argentina.'
Unfortunately for the Argentine people, Kuznets referenced the country because of its tragic
economic performance in the last century. For him and those who followed his school of thought,
like Lance Taylor, the reasons behind the decline are the lack of institutions to create successful
policies, external shocks, and even the global change of trade agreements in the modern world.

Rafael Di Tella, an Argentine economist and William Zeigler professor at Harvard Business
School, has drafted an interesting analogy: 'If a guy has been hit by 700,000 bullets, it's hard to
work out which one of them killed him.'1 Likewise, Argentina is an unresolved puzzle in which its
historical mistakes and setbacks greatly influence its current economic behavior.

In 1985, the President of the United States, Ronald Reagan, reflected on the spirit of Argentina
when he welcomed Raul Alfonsin, Argentina's President from 1983 to 1989, after 26 years since
the last state visit of an Argentinean president to Washington2:
Argentina and the United States, though at different ends of the hemisphere, have much in
common. The spirit of freedom and independence that freed the people of the United States,
only a short time later, spread to Argentina. And your country is one of the oldest democracies
of the hemisphere. The flame of liberty burned red hot in Argentina. And your country was the
first on the continent to ban slavery. This was no mere coincidence, Mr. President; the
Argentine people are the heirs of a great legacy. Similar to our own experience, Argentina was
a frontier society, a land where people came from many parts of the world to better themselves
and to live in freedom, an undeveloped land, yet one blessed by God with a richness of soil and
resources. Our forefathers, here and in your country, shared the challenge of turning a
wilderness into a modern nation.

1

Rafael Di Tella. "Hit by 700,000 Bullets". Harvard Political Review. Harvard Political Review. May 18, 2014. Link:
https://harvardpolitics.com/hit-700000-bullets/
2
Remarks at the Welcoming Ceremony for President Raul Alfonsin of Argentina. Ronal Reagan Library, Presidential
Library and Museum. March 19, 1985.
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Somewhere along Argentina's history, people's dreams for a better future got broken because of
chronic economic underperformance and economic policy inconsistency.

Argentina represents a critical case in economic history. Its potential reinvention could offer an
example that emerging economies could reorganize their political economy despite suffering the
worse impacts of high inflation, untrusted currency, low levels of international trade, and debt
mismanagement.

The private sector has a protagonist role in shifting Argentina's current downturn. As the Argentine
Institute for Fiscal Analysis (IARAF) showed in its publication in June 2022, Argentina has 9.13
million workers in the private sector (excluding the informal sector) and 3.33 million in the public
sector. Of that 9.13 workers in the private sector, 6.04 million are wage labor. Consequently, for
every 100 wage labor in the private sector, there are 55 workers in the public sector. This
relationship between wage labor in public and private sectors has gotten worse in the last 10 years.
In 2012, the same relation was 42 for every 100 wage labor workers in the private sector3. The
public sector employs too many workers in an economy under deficit budgets, making it
unsustainable in the mid and long term. In other words, the private sector needs to reinvent itself in
a framework of competitiveness and stable profitability to ensure the stability of the Argentinean
job market.

Since World War II, Argentina has experienced economic stagnation with erratic policymaking in
multiple fields: foreign affairs, finance, macroeconomics, and trade. In recent decades, the public
sector has oversized its dimension. The number of people who receive a salary or a subsidy from
the States is at record highs. The pressure on the private sector is one of the highest in the world.
The Argentine government has no access to the international credit system. Its balance of payments
has a persistent deficit, and the constant stress of hard currency shortages has become a neverending crisis. Argentina seems to live a chronic frustration for decades. The nation has become an
undesirable partner in the region and the world. Nevertheless, Argentina has many comparative
advantages and resources to climb its way back to sustainable economic development.

3

Argentine Institute for Fiscal Analysis (IARAF). Publication on Employment, June 2022.
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Historically, the energy sector has been one of the largest industries in charge of significant
investments in infrastructure for energy production and distribution4. In this context, the industry
raised millions of dollars in funding from corporate bonds to private loans through historical
legends such as YPF and Pan American Energy. This capital was allocated mainly to oil wells,
refineries, and logistics centers to work out the entire energy supply chain. Since the discovery of
one of the largest non-conventional shale oil and natural gas reserves in the world5, and the role of
energy in global markets, the energy sector has enormous potential for the Argentine economy.

Vaca Muerta is one of the world's largest non-conventional shale oil and natural gas reserves. Vista
Oil & Gas is a firm that raised capital to start operations with a primary focus in Vaca Muerta (VM).
By doing so, Vista became a model for the private sector to look for potentialities in Argentina and
export products that positively add to the trade balance. Vista's senior management also represents
the ideal management for an Argentinean firm that looks to have a leading role in international
markets. They have solid international exposure to competitive markets and local experience in
Argentina.

This research addresses how firms like Vista could play a role in reversing decades of poor
macroeconomic performance and how the Argentina government should capitalize on those
opportunities through economic policy management. Making the case, Vista's business model for
developing the energy sector is an example of adding value despite current economic complexities,
specifically in oil and gas production in the Vaca Muerta regions.

This research frames an Argentina summary description of its economic situation, short term
history, and main lessons to build its economic opportunities, especially in the energy sector.
Consequently, the thesis presents Vista as a firm in the private sector with the capacity to cooperate
and mitigate and turnaround Argentina's economic imbalances.

Chapter 1 assesses the Argentine macroeconomic performance between 2016 and 2021, covering
Macri's administration and the first two years of Alberto Fernandez's presidency. Chapter 1 main
goal is to review the frameworks in Argentine during the last five years by understanding the most

4

Solberg, Carl E. "Oil and nationalism in Argentina: a history." US Department of Energy, Office of Scientific and
Technical Information(1979).
5
US Energy Information Administration. Technically Recoverable Shale Oil and Shale Gas Resources: An Assessment
of 137 Shale Formations in 41 Countries Outside the United States. June 2013.
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significant challenges: inflation, the balance of payments, debt and fiscal balance, and
unemployment.

In the second chapter, the study analyzes the energy sector in Argentina and its central policies
from 2003. After 2001, especially in Kirchner's administration, the Argentine government reversed
its 90s deregulations by increasing State interventions and did not find the right energy path to
stabilize regulations to attract investments massively.

In chapter 3, the research will go deep into the Argentine energy markets and the most important
players to have a good picture of who is who and how Argentina designed its energy sector from
the 90s until the present in the last four administrations.

In chapter 4, this work reviews Vista Oil and Gas and its competitive advantages and strengths by
studying its financial statements, strategy, and upside in the short-term future.

One of the most important sections is chapter 5. This research covers Argentine microeconomic
policies that went wrong and why. Furthermore, it will review the role of the State when it tries to
establish a sustainable and trustable environment for business. This section studies cases that
significantly impacted Argentine macroeconomic evolution and energy sector development: the
barril criollo, the exchange rate liberation and free capital flow, the Argentine-Chile gas pipeline
for natural gas, and the bond subsection K for infrastructure case. This experience has signed
Argentina's credibility abroad (for what happened with Chile) and the legal and institutional
credibility of the other issues.

The sixth chapter compiles Argentina's economic lessons and opportunities to find the proper
economic policymaking to boost economic growth and its energy sector. This section focuses on
two influential areas of Argentina: Inflation and price controls and Argentine long-term vision.

Before the conclusion, chapter 7 analyzes Argentine policymaking and the energy sector
perspectives. This segment is central to the overall research because it considers all the elements
covered in previous chapters and positions Argentina in the global context proposing relevant
challenges and opportunities to refocus Argentine policymaking to a more pragmatic and long-term
economic vision.

4

CHAPTER I: ARGENTINE MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE FROM 2016-2021

This chapter identifies that stagflation is the best storyteller for Argentine macroeconomic
performance from 2015 to 2021. Moreover, this section will focus on understanding the main
Argentine macroeconomic policies and effects covering the presidencies of Mauricio Macri’s
(2015-2019) and the first two years of Alberto Fernandez’s term (2019-Present).
Iain Macleod, a British politician who became Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1970, used the term
stagnation in a 1965 speech to the House of Commons to refer to the gravity of the UK economic
situation, he said: "We now have the worst of both worlds—not just inflation on the one side or
stagnation on the other, but both together. We have a sort of 'stagflation' situation. And history, in
modern terms, is indeed being made6". This stagnation crisis was a big issue during the mid60s,70s, and early 80s. In a context of a post gold standard era, high volatility in FX markets, and
a recession (all at the same time); monetary policy was quite complex due to amount and nature of
the economic issues.
Throughout its history Argentina has been affected by long stagflationary periods, which
administrations tried to heal by expansionary policies that ran on deficits that made the inflation
even worse. In a more empirical approach, Michael Bruno and Jeffrey D Sachs commented, in
1985, in their book Economics of Worldwide Stagflation, the poor macroeconomic performance of
past decades was almost nowhere foreseen and challenged some of the central tenets of postwar
macroeconomics, including the belief in a stable inflation-unemployment trade-off in the efficacy
of expansionary macroeconomic policies to reduce unemployment. For Bruno and Sachs, the
‘stagflation’ problem had dramatic consequences and it required a deep analysis on the set of
strategies to solve it. They argue against those who support that expansionary policies that do not
work to reduce unemployment because a rationally expected monetary policy will always and
immediately be rendered ineffective by the behavior of forward-looking individuals7. Individuals
tend to hedge inflation mostly on expectations, and Bruno and Sachs based the their conclusions,
by understanding the lessons of the UK, Japan, and the United States from 1976 to the 80s.
Until Paul Volcker, Fed Chairs tried to fight inflation and recession at the same time as they
alternately raised and lowered interest rates. Their stop-go monetary policy led to consumers and

6
7

House of Commons Official Report (also known as Hansard), 17 November 1965, page 1,165.
Bruno, Michael, and Jeffrey D. Sachs. Economics of worldwide stagflation. Harvard University Press, 2013.
5

businesses confusion about a longer term8. Firms would raise prices to stay ahead of future highinterest rates and unpredictability. As a result, consumers kept buying before prices rose even more.
In 1980, the Volcker Shock raised the fed funds rate to its highest point in history to end doubledigit inflation. The influence of the shock had massive importance in managing inflation
expectations. Long story short, the US resolved its price disruption crisis, and had an extraordinary
economic performance in the years ahead. Volcker’s experience has resonated in many countries
and one case was close to Argentina: Brazil in 1999.
On March 4, 1999, Arminio Fraga was appointed President of the Central Bank of Brazil. On his
first day in the new role, he jacked up benchmark interest rates to 45%, and Brazil had a similar
economic stabilization path as the US experienced after the Volcker shock. Despite big
macroeconomic differences between developed and emerging economies (EM), Fraga showed the
emerging world that regardless of having a weaker currency, a different institutional framework,
and higher vulnerabilities to external shocks (such as an oil crisis), the stagflation crisis can be
solved with local interest rates. Ever since Brazil’s Arminio Fraga revolutionized this tactic after
the January 1999 maxi-devaluation of the BRL, EM Central Banks have used intervention to
smooth out volatility that can cause preemptive and defensive price setting by the private sector9.
Fraga also has a deep understanding of the problem: To regain investors and consumers’
confidence, economies must identify the right action. The distinction between fiscal and monetary
front is key.
THE BIG PICTURE

After Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner’s administration (2007-2015), Argentina was experiencing
deep stagflation (high inflation and slow growth), restrictions in the foreign exchange market,
negative international holdings in the central bank, and the economy lacked sustainable growth for
decades. In 2015, the State had major economic interventions from restrictions on multinational
corporate’s dividends to significant subsidies in energy and transportation. Unfortunately, in those
years, Argentina did not settle part of the debt restructuring with bondholders from 2001 because
many bondholders did not accept the new terms Argentina was offering to restructure its debt and
instead of accepting new bonds, they chose to argue in court for a better deal. After a series of
litigations in NY Courts, some outstanding debt was risking the entire restructure that was agreed

8

Taylor, John B. "A historical analysis of monetary policy rules." Monetary policy rules. University of Chicago, 1999.
319-348.
9
Argentine Notes, PPI Investments. Research and Strategy Department. December 18 th, 2020.
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upon in 2003, 2005, and 201010. After the 2001 crisis, Argentina from international credit markets.
When a country must look for financing sources, only taxes, money printing, State companies, and
international borrowing are available options. If the nation is outside the financial world, it must
turn to tax collection, monetary expansion, or profits from State- owned companies. For Argentina,
raising taxes was no option because it already had one of the highest tax burdens in the world11.
Moreover, State’s enterprises such as Aerolineas Argentina’s (national airlines) or YPF (energy
flagship) were not profitable, and they needed capital injections (subsidies) from the State to exist.
Consequently, with defaulted bonds in international markets after 2001, the Argentine government
could only finance the deficit through monetary expansion. Furthermore, printing money in
Argentina has a long history of price disruptions with serious effects on inflation, its supply chain
(stock shortages to store value of goods), and exchange rate. When new pesos are entered in the
economy without support, every investor looks for hedge with hard currencies such as US dollars.
This effect has endless consequences on the Argentine economy: inflation inertia due to future
expectations, a pass-through effect of devaluations on inflation, and domestic price disruptions.
Furthermore, an economy without a clear pricing creates speculations on goods inventories and
when shortage to store value show up (versus a weak currency) the State intervene more in the
economy to try to avoid an inflation escalation (because stock shortages pressure inflation even
more).

Public Debt as a %GDP, Argentina

Source: INDEC, Statistics Bureau from Argentina.

10

Hornbeck, J. F. (2013). Argentina's Defaulted Sovereign Debt: Dealing with the "Holdouts". Congressional Research
Service.
11
The Global Competitiveness Report. Insight Report. World Economic Forum. 2015-2016.
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When Macri won the national election (2015), the economic team tried to orchestrate a series of
targets and reforms that aimed to achieve economic normalization. First, Argentina reduced the tax
on exports on commodities which were one of the main sources of hard currency to the economy12.
The rationale for this reform was that, without those impositions, the private sector would have
more incentives to produce and export more earning FX. Second, it raised nominal rates over
inflation expectations and attracted investors to AR pesos instruments instead of hard currency.
Third, the government lifted all type of restrictions in FX markets and allowed a free supply and
demand to find the right USD/ARS price reference. Moreover, the administration also reduced the
restrictions to imports (eliminating the DJAI instrument which was a import declaration that
required an explicit authorization of the State. This became a tool to delay imports and reduce,
artificially, the demand of hard currency because government official delay imports) which would
create more demand of hard currency for payments to the abroad as consequence of international
trade operations. Furthermore, Argentina also decided to drastically reduce the money printing and
transfers from the Central Bank to the Treasury to limit inflation. The Macri administration chose
international and local debt to finance its deficit. By the end of 2015, public debt with the
international community was quite low. The only fence between Argentina and international
markets was the conflict a holdouts minority13.
The intentions and challenges of the Macri’s administration were auspicious for economic
normalization; however, the policing did not work, and the economy suffered the effects of an
erratic policy orchestration. Inflation targeting policies were ineffective, the USD/ARS performed
massive devaluations yearly, and Argentiean international bonds sales in US dollars overcame
China and South Korea in debt issued in hard currency that year as this research covers deeply in
the following chapters14. Moreover, in 2019, just before leaving office, the Macri’s administration
reprofiled local currency bonds issued in the previous 2 to 3 years, meaning that the maturity of
outstanding debt in local currency had to be restructured to avoid default. According to the Bank
of England, governments rarely default on local currency sovereign debt15, there were only 34 cases
from 1960 to 2019. More than half of them is related to exchanging old currency for new on

12

Legislación y Avisos Oficiales: Decreto 133/2015 (Executive Order 133/2015. Ministry of Agriculture. Link to the
legislation: https://www.boletinoficial.gob.ar/detalleAviso/primera/138329/20151217
13
Hornbeck, J. F. (2013). Argentina's Defaulted Sovereign Debt: Dealing with the "Holdouts". Congressional Research
Service.
14
Sovereign debt issuance in emerging markets from 01-01-16 to 09-18-17. League Table, Bloomberg Terminal.
15
Beers, D., Jones, E., & Walsh, J. (2020). Special topic: how frequently do sovereigns default on local currency debt?
BoE.
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confiscatory terms (e.g., Ghana, North Korea, Myanmar, and USSR/Russia). Any of the 34 were
performed by a country that just four years ago agreed a debt restructure with holdouts16.
In 2019, Alberto Fernandez won the Argentine presidential election in a context of high polarization
between the Kirchnerismo and Cambiemos (which was led by Mauricio Macri, the current
President at that time). Despite the extreme differences between Cambiemos and the Kirchner´s
front (that was allied with the Peronismo), Alberto Fernandez was presented as a moderate
candidate that could bring stability with a centered policy that looked to unify those groups that
were very frustrated with the Kirchner and Macri’s economic performance. Electoral narrative
aside, Alberto Fernandez was chosen to run for the presidency by Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner,
who also ran as vice-president in the same formula.
The government of Alberto Fernandez did not improve the Argentine macroeconomic performance
either. The Covid-19 pandemic demanded more fiscal spending, and the deficit grew to even higher
levels than previous administrations. The deficit was covered through monetary expansion with no
hard currency addition. The policy disrupted prices and FX rates. Despite efforts to keep the
economy afloat, Argentina suffered a major downturn comparable to its own 2001 financial crisis.
In this context, the gigantic loan payment to International Monetary Fund (IMF) was not settled,
and Fernandez’s administration had to open negotiations to re-schedule future payments. Because
of this macroeconomic mismanagement, poverty and unemployment rates skyrocketed.

LOCAL INTEREST RATES AND INFLATION

When countries face inflationary tensions, the interest rates are an important tool to control and
influence credit and price references. In the case of Argentina, the complexity arises when we
consider that the economy was already slowing down, and the credit is already in low levels of
activity. In 2016, the government tried to control inflation through interest rates risking an
economic recovery. During that time, the discussions between economists to reorganize the
economy were a shock policy versus a progressive alternative. Nevertheless, both sides understood
that a correction was necessary. In this context, the Central Bank tried to balance the trade-off
between growth and inflation17, as it is shown below in the chart Inflation and Economic Trade Off

16

Daniel Bases, Richard Lough, Sarah Marsh. Argentina, lead creditors settle 14-year debt battle for $4.65 billion.
February 29, 2016. Reuters. Article link: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-argentina-debt/argentina-lead-creditorssettle-14-year-debt-battle-for-4-65-billion-idUSKCN0W2249
17
MacroView SA. Economic Consulting for Balanz Capital, Buenos Aires, March 14, 2017.
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Model for the Central Bank. This table shows the most significant alternatives for the Central Banks
given the conditions Argentina had at the beginning of 2016. Inflation was exposed to the liberation
of the exchange rate by a passthrough effect, and domestic prices were also exposed to high deficits
from the Kirchner's administration. Inflation was a priority, however, Macri's economic team also
understood that reactivating the economy was more important than slowing down inflation, so some
other paths than just cooling prices are shown in in the table Inflation and Economic Trade Off
Model for the Central Bank. As this research shows in following chapters, not taming inflation has
been critical for Macri and the exchange mismanagement markets became a nightmare for the
economy and its price references.

Inflation and Economic Growth Trade Off Model for the Central Bank

Source: Data from INDEC, design by MacroView SA.

In 2016, the narrative suggested that investments from local and international investors would drive
economic recovery. However, as we can see in the chart below, from 1995 to 2016, history shows
that investments in the economy are down when the GDP is down.
GDP growth versus Investments% GDP, 1995-2016

Source: Data from INDEC, design by MacroView SA.

From the start, interest rates were elevated to control price disruptions. However, as the government
lifted all the FX market restrictions, the first disruption came in with the homogenization of the

10

USDARS official exchange rate, and the blue-chip swap FX rate (BCSR)18, were 9.92 and 14.16
respectively on December 16, 2015. In other words, the Argentine economy had two different
exchange rates for pricing references. Some economic agents had access to the official rate, such
as authorized importers, but the rest of the economy was already pricing the blue-chip swap
reference. This exchange rate normalization is important for inflation because of the passthrough
to prices from the FX correction of those importers buying semi-finished products or different
inputs for the Argentine supply chain. As a result, the official exchange closed the 42% gap to the
blue chip swap rate in a matter of days. However, the story did not finish; during 2016, the
USDARS increased 19.60% from $14.13 in the offer on January 4 to $16.90 on December 30.
These devaluations and pass-throughs from 2016 to 2021 were intense. The US dollar against the
Argentine peso in its blue-chip FX rate went from 14.57 to 205.07 from December 2015 to the end
of 202119. The Argentine Central Bank (BCRA20) tried to discourage investors from exchanging
Argentine pesos to hard currency and offered positive real interest rates in pesos to keep capital out
of US dollar-denominated instruments. As we see in the chart about the evolution of interest rates
in the economy during 2018, the Argentine Central Bank had a 27.25% interest rate in April that
went up to 60.28% in November, to finally hitting a 52w high of 73.52% in late September/early
October of 2018. Besides, the repo rate is an inter-banking reference that has suffered some changes
in its structure, it always works as a benchmark reference for high volume transactions21.

18

The Blue-Chip Swap is a legal mechanism in Argentina for reporting entities and individuals to hold and perhaps
transfer US Dollars. It is effected through the purchase of a US Dollar-denominated security onshore, transfer of the
security offshore, and sale of the security for US Dollars. The buy and sell of the bond create an implied exchange rate.
Once US Dollars have been received, the reporting entity can either hold them offshore to hedge against the devaluation
of the peso or may be able to use the US Dollars to relieve US Dollar-denominated obligations. Source: PwC Publication
date: June 16, 2020.
19
Newspaper’s quick reference from the best blue-chip FX rate available in the fixed income market. El Cronista, dólar
contado con liquidación: https://www.cronista.com/MercadosOnline/moneda.html?id=ARSCONT
20
BCRA: Banco Central de la Republica Argentina, the Central Bank of the Argentine Republic.
21
For the repo rate (blue) until August 8th, 2018, it was a 7d reference, then it changed to a 28d reference.
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Interest Rates Evolution, 2018 (annualized rates)

Source: Data from BCRA, design by MacroView SA.

The retail and corporate markets had higher interest rates because of commissions and taxes. A
loan would look like 100-120% TALC22 for a retail consumer depending on the bank during
October 201823. These levels of interest rates complicate an economic recovery and the credit
sector.

Inflation track record, 2015-2018

CPI Wholesale vs CPI Retail

Source: INDEC, Statistics Bureau from Argentina.

Source: INDEC, Statistics Bureau from Argentina.

Despite the economic downturn and high-interest rates, inflation remained high from 2015 to 2018.
As the CPI Wholesale vs CPI Retail Chart shows from April 2018, the IPIM-INDEC Index
‘Wholesale Inflation’ skyrocketed, and companies had difficulty pricing the supply chain. When in
doubt, the private sector chose to hold inventory because of the difficulties in forecasting a
replacement. Consequently, the offering of products decreased, and prices had more upward
pressure.
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TALC: Total annual loan cost, including commercial commissions plus taxes.
Reference from Santander and Galicia Bank Argentina. Terms and conditions applied. October 2018.
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M2 and M2 Private from 2015 to 2018

Source: Data from BCRA, Banco Central Argentina.

Source: Data from BCRA, Banco Central Argentina.

From 2017 to 2018, the cash in circulation grew at 30.6% YOY24. The annualized M2 and M2
Private monetary base growth rates in 1H17 and 1H18 were between 28% to 40%. In retrospect,
the rate expansion was too high, and it clearly had an enormous effect on prices since the amount
of money in the economy and its interest were quite unsustainable. Each Central Bank bills auction,
every week or two weeks (depending on the program, the BCRA changed it a couple of times) was
dramatic, and the pricing/interest rate was very sensitive to investors’ confidence. Consequently,
Investors proposed a binary game: if interest rates were not convenient enough, they would turn to
US dollars. From 2015 to 2019, the famous carry trade in local Argentine bills or local currency
bonds was the most attractive high yield allocation for risk-takers. The investments were highly
profitable, and the main risk was an eventual currency devaluation that investors hedged in the
Argentine future FX markets or through NDFs or NDOs25 in the OTC market. In an economy like
Argentina, interest rates, FX prices, and inflation are massively interconnected and very hard to
orchestrate.

USD/ARS RATES AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS

The lack of hard currency in the economy while performing an expansionary monetary policy is
one of the biggest challenges in emerging markets. Especially in economies that have undeveloped
markets that suffer liquidity issues or irregular interventions from regulators. In EM, the balance

24

* Cash in circulation growth has slowed to 4.1% YOY from the average of 30.6% during Schwarzenegger’s tenure at the BCRA
(last 18 mo).
* The surge in the value of the BCRA’s current accounts highlights the power of reserve requirements to sweep liquidity from the
economy.
25

NDF: Non-deliverable forward. NDO: Non-deliverable option.
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between having a competitive currency to export, attracting enough US dollars, and avoiding wage
inflation or an exchange rate lag is complex. Imbalances in the right levels of hard currency in the
economy can create foreign exchange rate overshooting, and the debt issued in US dollars could
increase default risks. Since many decades ago, Argentina cannot find a sustainable equilibrium to
keep a balanced amount of hard currency in the economy versus its monetary base. Depending on
its economic cycle, either Argentina's monetary expansion was too ambitious or not competitive
enough to maintain a good US dollar balance. Many indicators and triggers show the weaknesses
of previous Argentine models. One is the trade relation and bilateral exchange rate with Brazil. It
is not a coincidence that the best years of the balance of payments in Argentina correlate with the
years of a more convenient ARS FX rate versus BRL (Brazilian Real currency) as shown in the
chart' Bilateral Exchange rate ARS/BRL today, annual averages26’.

Bilateral Exchange rate ARS/BRL today, annual averages

Source: INDEC, Statistics Bureau from Argentina.

For Argentina, the lack of consistency to produce hard currency is a high vulnerability to massive
devaluations when it pegs the Argentinean peso to the US dollar. As mentioned in the first part of
this chapter, from 2016 to 2021, the US dollar against the Argentine peso in its blue-chip FX rate
went from 14.57 to 205.0727. Every year, the agribusiness exports monopolized the news headlines
because of their significance as a percentage to the total inflow of US dollars. Historically,
Argentina tends to condition imports to the levels of exports. In other words, the government
tightens imports if the exports look weak.
26

INDEC prints on Balance of Payments 1999-Present. Real rates from Bloomberg.

27

Newspaper’s quick reference from the best blue-chip FX rate available in the fixed income market. El Cronista, dólar
contado con liquidación: https://www.cronista.com/MercadosOnline/moneda.html?id=ARSCONT
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Professor Murray Chilvers Kemp, author of the classic text ‘The Pure Theory of International
Trade and
Investment’, explains the importance of understanding the true incremental behind the change in
exports/imports. As the Statistics Bureau in Argentina (INDEC) disaggregates in volume and price
in its international trade reports, not all prices increased at the same speed. Between 2020 and 2021,
the 42% increase in value of exports resulted from a 25.8% rise in prices and a 12.9% rise in
volumes, while the 49.2% increase in value of imports arose from a rise of 14.7% in prices and
30.1% in volumes. Consequently, the terms of trade improved a lot for Argentina between 2020
and 202128. However, this trade balance surplus did not affect the foreign exchange market
positively in 2021, the Blue-Chip Swap rate started in 2021 at 140.26 and finished at 205.07. This
increase implied a 46.21% devaluation.

Professor Kemp explains with strong fundamentals that the balance of payments records the
transactions that in a quarter, or a year, the residents of one country make with the residents of other
countries. The international exchange of goods is a class of transactions, but not the only one. There
is also an international exchange of services, both real and financial29. For example, spending on
tourism and collection and payment of interest, respectively. Argentina has a systematic deficit in
its service accounts, both real and financial. In Argentina, the trade balance surplus must be wide
enough to finance deficits in exchange services, the private sector’s hard currency demands, and
international reserves if the BCRA has an expansionary monetary policy. Otherwise, the FX market
shorts the peso against the US dollar due to monetary imbalances, increasing pressure to a
devaluation. The Chart: ‘Low Exports: The Key to Understand Exchange Rate Instability’ shows
how the 2020 results were insufficient to stabilize the FX market and avoid inflationary new spikes.

28
29

INDEC prints on Trade Balance 2020-2021.
Remp, M. C. "The pure theory of international trade and investment." Englewood Cliffs, New (1969).
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Low Exports: The Key to Understand Exchange Rate Instability
(plus a structural mistrust of the peso to keeps its value)

Source: Data from BCRA, design by MacroView SA.

DEBT AND FISCAL POLICY

How poorly timed have policy changes been? How credible have government announcements been? To
what extent have responses to policy changes followed predictions?30
⸺ Alan J. Auerbach

The Argentine federal government lost its primary fiscal surplus in 2010. Moreover, from that year
until the present, Argentina has always spent more than it had, and that pattern intensified from
2015 to 2017. The first consideration should ponder that 2015 was an election year. Inappropriately,
administrations always spend funds in campaign mode to create an apparent economic boom before
the election term. Secondly, the Macri administration tried to reframe the fiscal structure of
Argentina. The first-two-years, the fiscal deficit was highly influenced by an economic slowdown,
a decrease of tax collection in real terms, and the ‘Fiscal Consensus Plan’31. This fiscal initiative
transferred funds from the federal administration to some state budgets (Buenos Aires City and the
Province of Buenos Aires were the most benefited). The chart below: ‘Keys to Understand
Inflation: Fiscal Deficit Unsustainability’ shows that due to the above reasons, the amount of
30

Auerbach, Alan. "The Effectiveness of Fiscal Policy as Stabilization Policy." Bank of Korea International
Conference on the Effectiveness of Stabilization Policies, (May). 2005.
31
Changes in Ley 23.548. Coparticipación Federal de Impuestos: 2017 and 2018 and Executives Orders such as
Decreto 194/2016 and Decreto 406/2016.
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spending %GDP for subsidies, pensions, and social plans reached 14.7% in 2015-2017, only
comparable with the pandemic time.

Keys to Understand Inflation: Fiscal Deficit
Unsustainability

Primary and Global Fiscal Results from 2004-19

Source: INDEC, Statistics Bureau from Argentina.

Source: Data from INDEC, design by MacroView SA.

The Big Picture section of this first chapter explained how Argentina supported its strategy to
reorganize its economy through debt in international markets. Indeed, during 2016-17, despite
concerns about the sluggish pace of the economic recovery, the stubborn nature of double-digit
inflation, and a budget deficit, Argentina managed to become the largest issuer in emerging markets
over countries like China and Korea32.

Ranking of Emerging Markets Issuers, 2016-2017

Source: Bloomberg.
32

Sovereign debt issuance in emerging markets from 01-01-16 to 09-18-17. League Table, Bloomberg Terminal.
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Unfortunately, the new issued debt had ambitious maturities that stressed Argentine forecast. In
2018, after two years of going back to the international debt markets and settling with the last
holdout creditors from the 2001 financial crisis, Argentina could not rollover its debt (hard currency
bonds).
Facing the impossibility of not being able to take on debt in capital markets, and as a last resort,
Argentina turned to the IMF to look for short-term financing and meet debt payments. In September
2018, Argentina received the biggest loan package ever from the International Monetary Fund,
aimed at shoring up the country's ailing finances: $57.1bn that was disbursed in three years33. Strict
restrictions on funds included commitment to zero deficit for 2019 and limits on central bank
interventions. To achieve these goals, the government cut subsidies on energy, transportation, and
other public services.
Subsidies Cuts: Schedule of Rate Hikes

Source: Casa Rosada Press Report.

Despite the corrections were needed, the timing was tragic: Economic slowdown, massive
devaluations, and high inflation. The subsidies cuts stressed an already poorer low class. The
middle class suffered a depreciation of real wages. The new agreements between the government
and the IMF were far from a solution to calm down the perception that the Argentine economic
model was unsustainable. The chart below: 5Y CDS Argentina vs Brazil shows how the country
risk premium doubled its levels from 2017. The velocity of the money in Argentina started to move
out of control, and the BCRA increased interest rates again to an attractive level versus a hard
currency positioning.

33

Di Tella, Rafael, and Andrés Velasco. "Comments and Discussion." Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (2019):
412-436.
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5Y CDS Argentina (blue) vs Brazil (red)

Argentina Velocity of the Money Index

Source: Bloomberg.

Source: Bloomberg.

As observed in the chart ‘Public Debt as a %GDP, Argentina’, the country started in 2015 with a
Debt-GDP ratio of 52.6% and finished with 88.8% in 2019. The Covid-19 found Argentina with a
scarce health infrastructure and high poverty levels. Increasing subsidies and allocating budget to
health accounts the deficit stressed even more, and public debt reached a 107% by 2021 according
to stimations from the Ministery of Economy. Moreover, the credit line that Argentina got from the
IMF was renegociated by the new administration of Alberto Fernandez in 2022.
UNEMPLOYMENT AND THE LABOR MARKET

As of 2016, inflation and lack of access to credit wreaked havoc on the lower and lower-middleclass of Argentina. On the other hand, unemployment rates remained relatively stable due to
increases in unemployment benefits and social plans that prevented a potential collapse of
thousands of households. Poverty, however, shot up, breaking historical levels. The graph 'Urban
Poverty Rate Evolution, 2010-2021' shows a worsening of the economic and social situation of
millions of Argentinians who are in poverty. The most severe and unfortunate case is that the
macroeconomic imbalances and economic slowdown left 64.9 of every 100 poor boys and girls
between 0 and 17 years of age in a state of poverty34.

34

Donza, E.R., Poy, S. Efectos de la pandemia COVID-19 sobre la dinámica del trabajo en la argentina urbana: una
mirada crítica sobre el impacto heterogéneo del actual escenario tras una década de estancamiento económico (20102020) [en línea]. Documento Estadístico del Barómetro de la Deuda Social Argentina. 2021. 2. Disponible en:
https://repositorio.uca.edu.ar/handle/123456789/12018
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Urban Poverty Rate Evolution, 2010-2021

Key Macroeconomic Indicators, 2015-2021

Source: Data from INDEC, design by MacroView SA.

Source: EDSA Bicentenario (2010-2016) y EDSA Agenda para la
Equidad (2017-2025), Observatorio de la Deuda Social Argentina, UCA

The drama of this scenario lies in its history. Before the poverty 'implosion' in the 2018-19 debt
crisis and subsequent pandemic, Argentina already had a delicate social structure35. Recurring
economic crises, such as the hyperinflations in 1983 and 1989, its historical crisis of 2001, in
addition to external shocks like the tequila effect or the subprime crisis, led Argentina to live with
structural poverty. This structural poverty caused many families to get used to surviving with
assistance from the state. These government aids were implemented through social plans, usually,
direct money transfers to eligible families. In a constant state of emergency, the government never
managed to improve the conditions of these programs. In these solutions, the beneficiaries did not
have to make any compensation, and there was no time limit for the aid. For these reasons, in 2016,
when these assistance programs suffered budget cuts, people did not manage to make a proper
transition to the productive sector. Subsidies for transportation, energy, and other public services
were also cut. Although there was an incentive to apply for rate exemptions if a low-income family
was recognized, many households were not able to take advantage of such aid due to such high
informality.

35

Donza, E.R., Poy, S. Efectos de la pandemia COVID-19 sobre la dinámica del trabajo en la argentina urbana: una
mirada crítica sobre el impacto heterogéneo del actual escenario tras una década de estancamiento económico (20102020) [en línea]. Documento Estadístico del Barómetro de la Deuda Social Argentina. 2021. 2. Disponible en:
https://repositorio.uca.edu.ar/handle/123456789/12018
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Multidimensional Structural Poverty: Income Poverty in 3
or more lacks % of the population 2010-2021

Fuente: EDSA Bicentenario (2010-2016) y EDSA Agenda para la Equidad
(2017-2025), Observatorio de la Deuda Social Argentina, UCA

The Multidimensional Structural Poverty graph shows the significant increase in structural poverty
in 2018 and how it intensified even more in the pandemic period. It is critical to understand that
the multidimensional mentioned in the graph considers the following dimensions36:
1-

Food and health,

2-

Access to basic services in terms of sanitation and quality of life,

3-

Decent housing,

4-

Access to a healthy environment,

5-

Educational access,

6-

Employment and social security.

Therefore, if a person lacks 3 or more of the dimensions mentioned above, that person/family is
determined to be in a state of structural poverty. Argentina lived the last 12 years with a structural
poverty that averages the 18.91% of its population. The lack of sensitivity to those who were in the
periphery of the system is Argentina’s highest social debt in its economy policymaking.

‘Si la economía es el juicio en los gastos (Jean-Baptiste Say), la disipación es la locura en el gobierno y en
el país. No hay un barómetro más exacto para estimar el grado de sensatez y civilización de cada país, que
su ley de presupuesto, o la cuenta de sus gastos públicos. La ley de gastos (si habla la verdad) nos dice a
punto fijo si el país se halla en poder de explotadores, o está regido por hombres de honor; si marcha a la
barbarie, o camina a su engrandecimiento; si sabe dónde está y a dónde va, o se encuentra a ciegas sobre
su destino y posición’.
⸺ Juan Bautista Alberdi, Sistema Económico y Rentístico de la Confederación Argentina, 1854.
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Donza, E.R., Poy, S. Efectos de la pandemia COVID-19 sobre la dinámica del trabajo en la argentina urbana: una
mirada crítica sobre el impacto heterogéneo del actual escenario tras una década de estancamiento económico (20102020) [en línea]. Documento Estadístico del Barómetro de la Deuda Social Argentina. 2021. 2. Disponible en:
https://repositorio.uca.edu.ar/handle/123456789/12018
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'If the economy is the judgment in the spending (Jean-Baptiste Say), the dissipation is the madness in the government
and the country. There is no more exact barometer to estimate each country's degree of wisdom and civilization than its
budget law or the account of its public expenses. The spending law (if the truth is spoken) tells us to a fixed point if the
country is in the power of exploiters, or is governed by men of honor; if it goes to barbarism, or walks to its
aggrandizement; whether you know where you are and where you are going, or you are in the dark about your
destination and position.
⸺ Juan Bautista Alberdi, The Economic and Financial System of the Argentine Confederation, 1854.

22

CHAPTER 2: ENERGY SECTOR IN ARGENTINA, MAIN POLICIES FROM 2003

This chapter explores the domestic energy matrix and the central policies since Néstor Kirchner’s
administration (2003-2007). The energy sector is one of the largest industries in Argentina. The
Vaca Muerta discovery as a sizeable unconventional gas resource in shale gas was a game-changer,
bringing prospects of self-sufficiency coupled to gas export opportunities either by using the
existing pipeline export infrastructure or exporting LNG to global gas markets. Moreover, this
industry can also positively impact Argentina's macro drivers; the energy sector can genuinely
produce hard currency inflows, create jobs, and push economic growth forward through exports.
Argentina is Latin America's largest producer of natural gas and the region's fifth-largest oil
producer after Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, and Venezuela in order of production37. In June 2013, an
U.S. Energy Information Administration report highlighted that Argentina has massive technically
recoverable shale gas and oil resources38. It placed Argentina in second place for technically
recoverable shale gas resources of 802 Tcf and fourth for technically recoverable tight oil resources
of 27 billion barrels. These resources could satisfy Argentina's energy demand for another 150
years at current consumption levels. In May 2014, during a visit to Argentina, Daniel Poneman,
former U.S. Secretary of Energy, singled out Vaca Muerta as a: 'first-class shale resource
worldwide.' predicting that 'Argentina may experience an energy boom similar to the U.S., which
will change its economy and level of competitiveness.
Argentina has a long history as a hydrocarbon producer with interesting surpluses available for
export until 2005, but gradually declining to deficits post 2011. Unfortunately, the country's
hydrocarbon production and demand were strongly affected by the last four governments' back and
forth in energy and economic policies. Consequently, the country has depended on imports to cover
the domestic market since 200939.
In 2020, Argentina produced 480,000 barrels per day (bpd) of oil, of which 134,000 bpd were
exported. While total oil production was down 20,000 bpd compared to 2019, oil exports were up
by 45,000 bpd due to reduced domestic demand related to COVID-19 quarantine measures.

37

US Energy Information Administration, EIA, June 2021. Link:
https://www.eia.gov/international/rankings/world?pa=173&u=0&f=A&v=none&y=01%2F01%2F2021&ev=false
38
US Energy Information Administration. Technically Recoverable Shale Oil and Shale Gas Resources: An Assessment
of 137 Shale Formations in 41 Countries Outside the United States. June 2013.
39
Carnicer, Roberto, and Ieda Gomes. Will Argentina become a relevant gas exporter? No. 167. OIES Paper: NG, 2021.
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Historically, Brazil and Chile constitute significant export markets for Argentina, especially natural
gas. The Argentina-Chile relationship in energy trade will have a specific section to detail the case.
In perspective, natural gas represents about 60 percent of Argentina's primary energy source.
However, gas demand has a high seasonality in Argentina. So, despite having one of the world's
largest shale gas deposits, the country needs to rely on liquified natural gas (LNG) imports to meet
domestic demand40.
Global companies, including Chevron, ConocoPhillips, ExxonMobil, Petronas, Shell, and Total,
have a significant presence in the Argentine energy market. However, YPF, Argentina's majority
state-owned energy company, holds the largest upstream sector share. In the context of Vaca
Muerte shale formation development, the sector has a significant need for small and medium-sized
service companies with shale expertise to enter the market to improve efficiency and lower costs.
At this point, Argentina is at the brink of the first potential shale revolution outside of North
America.

Historically, the Argentine's electricity matrix is generated mainly by hydrocarbon, accounting for
67% for oil and gas and 1% coal. However, policies encouraged alternative sources in recent years,
and wind and solar energy had rapid growth from less than 1% in 2015 to 8% in 2020. This wind
and solar market growth has placed Argentina as the fourth G20 nation in green energy
development. Hydraulics, bioenergy, and other renewables produce 17% of Argentine electricity,
while its shares decline and nuclear power generates 7% of the country's electricity41. In 2022, the
current Fernández administration signed a deal with China to build Atocha 3 to expand the nuclear
capacity. However, the project is in standby due to slowdown of the global economy and the
increase of interest rates worldwide.

40
41

Argentina - Country Commercial Guide. International Trade Association.
EMBER Global Electricity Review, G20 Profile, Argentina.
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Argentine Energy Market Overview

Source: 1- EMBER Global Electricity Review, G20 Profile, Argentina. 2- Ministry of Economy, Energy Department.

From 2003 to 2021, Argentina had four different presidents: Néstor Kirchner (2003-2007), Cristina
Fernandez de Kirchner (2007-2015), Mauricio Macri (2015-2019), and Alberto Fernandez, who is
currently in charge (2019-Present). As was covered in chapter 1, the political positions of each
President are drastically different. Especially between Cristina Kirchner and Mauricio Macri, and
this was not an exception in the energy sector.

After the 2001 crisis, Nestor Kirchner started with plenty of advantages, such as a competitive
currency value, a public sector that had already restructured its fiscal budget, and many underused
infrastructures. The context opened an excellent momentum for the energy sector because
increasing production is cheaper when the infrastructure is installed and there was no need of
significant capital. In addition, during his presidency, commodity prices were historically high, and
Argentina exported a structural energy surplus until 2010.
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Argentine Historical Primary Energy Balance (MTOE)

Source: Minem2.

In 2007, Argentina chose a new president, and despite Nestor not continuing for another term, his
wife (from the same political party and former Congress member) was the winner of that year's
national election. Six years after the biggest Argentine financial crisis in history, Cristina Kirchner's
presidency had far different circumstances than her predecessor. In 2008, (for example,) Argentina
suffered external shocks from the U.S. subprime crises and post-global recession that triggered a
strong economic slowdown. The discovery of Vaca Muerta was a significant catalyst to frame her
energy policies. Ideologically, Cristina Kirchner viewed the state as the leading actor in the
economy, and two approaches marked her energy policies during her presidency: t(T)he
nationalization of YPF and new legislation of hydrocarbons that encouraged FDI in shale oil and
gas. The table below, Main Government Policies in the Energy Sector, 2003 to 2020, shows in
detail the legislation and the description of each initiative.
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Overview of Main Government Policies in the Energy Sector, 2003-2020
Year

Presidency

90s

Menem

2004

Nestor Kirchner

2004

Nestor Kirchner

2004

Nestor Kirchner

2006

Nestor Kirchner

Law 26.095

2007

Nestor Kirchner

Government Resolution
459/07

2008

CF de Kirchner Executive Order 2014/2008

Legislation
Privatizations

Description
State-owned companies are offered to priviate firms which adquire them at "X" fair price. Example:
YPF privatization in 1989-1999.

Rationalization Program
Reorganization of hydrocarborns exports to deliver production to the internal market as a priority.
(Energy)

Law 25.943

The firm was founded in Dec 2004 by Law. The creation of Enarsa was a response to the energy
crisis endured by Argentina in 2004, caused in part by lack of investment by private fossil fuel
companies in infrastructure needed to meet the demand of natural gas.

Temporary Agreement for
This agreement was signed between Nestor Kirchner and Carlos Mera Gisbert. It was design to
Natural Gas Trading with
deliver the energy deficit Argentina was facing in its internal market.
Bolivia
Trust fund for the development of energy infrastructure

Total Energy Program / Programa Energia Total. Encourage the substitution of natural gas/electricity
consumption for alternative sources of energy.
(1) Oil Plus Program, (2) Refining Plus Program. Goal (1): Increase oil production and reserves. Goal
(2): Encourage new refineries and the expansion of new ones for more fuel production

2012/2013

CF de Kirchner

Ley 26.471 + EO
1277/2012 + 929/2013

2014

CF de Kirchner

Ley 27.007

2015-2019

Macri

Multiple Executive Orders Subsidies decrease. Electricity 1.8% to 0.9%. Gas 0.9%. Oil and Hydrocarbons 3% to 1.4%.

2015

Macri

The EO dissolves the Planning and Strategic Coordination Commission for National Hydrocarbon
Executive Order 272/2015 Investments. Instead, the Provinces take responsibility for the activities performed by the
Commission.

2015

Macri

2016

Macri

2016

Macri

Law 25.561 lost effect

2017

Macri

Production Agreement

2017-2018

Macri

Resultion 46/2017

2019

Alberto
Fernandez

Ley 27561

2019-2021

Alberto
Fernandez

Multiple Executive Orders Price intervention. Implementation of the "barril criollo", subsidies on locals prices.

2020

Alberto
Fernandez

Executive Order 892/2020

2020

Alberto
Fernandez

Executive Order 892/2020
The Federal Department of Energy was moved from Buenos Aires to Neuquen.
***

2020

Alberto
Fernandez

Law Reglamentation
27.191/2015

Hydrocarbons sovereignty. Hydrocarbons self sufficiency as public interest. YPF 51%
nationalization.

New Hydrocarbons Law. It changed old hydrocarbons law 17319/07.

Renewable energy was declared a public interest. The law created a fund to support production,
R&D, and equipment purchases.

Executive Order 136/2016 Renovar Program. Invitation to tender on renewable energy projects.

Law 27.605

Taxes on oil and gas exports lost effect (Law 25.561 was valid until January 6), and the administration
did not extend its applicability.
Vaca Muerta Agreement between Provincies, (Rio Negro, La Pampa y Neuquen), firms (YPF, Pan
American Energy, and Total Austral, and Unions.

Gas Plan in Vaca Muerta and other formations in Neuquen extensions.

Intervention in ENERGAS and ENRE (Regulators).

Gas Plan (4) 2020-2024. Extension of previous Gas Plans. Look for GNL sustitutions (trade with
Bolivia). Gas self sufficiency as a goal.

25% of the tax collection from Emergency Wealth Tax went YPF and IEASA (ex ENARSA) as
financial aid.

Source: 1- Ministry of Economy, Energy Department. 2- National Congress of Argentina.
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Initially, during Macri's administration, there was a process of policy decentralization as one of his
first actions was dissolving the National Planning and Strategic Coordination Commissions for
Hydrocarbon Investments. However, in 2017, the government realized that it was complex for
companies to deal with diverse regulations as they perform activities in different provinces. As a
solution, the federal government aligned provinces, companies, and unions to foster a shared
national strategy in a Production Agreement.

Similarly, Argentina had massive improvements in the green energy sector attracting local and
international investors in the renewable energy sector with a centralized policy approach. As a
result, Argentina went from <1% to 7% of its electricity matrix in the wind and solar sources.

The chapter will evaluate policies, political and economic drivers, and their effects on the industry
to have a solid understanding of the historical Argentine energy policy. In addition, each
administration will have its section to cover its main initiatives.
QUICK REVIEW ON THE ARGENTINE ENERGY SECTOR: 90s

During the 90s, Argentina had a significant focus on a free-market-oriented economy. Under Carlos
Menem's presidency (1989-1999), privatizations of prominent state-owned companies were one of
the leading strategies to attract investment and improve competition. Furthermore, there was
privatization in every sector, such as energy, transportation, military, and finance42. This policy
backed the government's intentions to increase productivity and reduce state activities in the
economy. The instrumentation of this new model was quick. A month after his election, Menem
sent the privatization bill to congress, which became law. The legislation declared a national
economic emergency, targeted fiscal deficit, and budget balance authorized the executive branch
to privatize 67 state-owned companies 43. However, YPF was the largest and most historic stateowned company targeted by the government44.

42

Chisari, Omar, Antonio Estache, and Carlos Romero. "Winners and losers from the privatization and regulation of
utilities: lessons from a general equilibrium model of Argentina." The World Bank Economic Review 13.2 (1999): 357378.
43
Luis Alberto Romero (2013). A History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century. The Pennsylvania University Press,
pág. 289.
44
YPF is a vertically integrated, state-owned Argentine energy company, engaged in oil and gas exploration and
production, and the transportation, refining, and marketing of gas and petroleum products. Founded in 1922 under
President Hipólito Yrigoyen's administration, YPF was the first oil company established as a state enterprise outside of
the Soviet Union, and the first state oil company to become vertically integrated. Source: YPF corporate Website.
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YPF’s Financial Statements, Assets, Liabilities, and Income 1979-1998 (US $ millions)
Year

1979 1980 1981

Total Assets

3,801 4,913 5,230 4,450 9,516 8,750 9,245 9,023

n/a

8,849

9,148 80,786 8,045 7,349 7,198 7,509 9,137 10,142 11,427 12,166

Total Debts

2,102 2,461 4,714 5,668 5,490 5,753 6,723 5,887

3,049 27,260 3,564 2,851 2,232 2,423 3,298

Operating Income -122 -442
Net Income

499

-314

1982

-202

1983

1984 1985 1986 1987 1988** 1989** 1990** 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996

1998

n/a

1,768

3,768

4,487

4,957

-66 -222

n/a

-176

-286

-781

263

523

714

708

961

1,519

1,608

1,127

-91 -524 -173

n/a

36

-257

69

253

256

706

538

793

817

877

580

-148 -425

105 -2,072 -1,687 -1,781

1997

*Operation income in 1979 and 1980 include financial results because it was filed in that way and there is no information about each account.
** In 1988, 1989, and 1990 the FS were filed in Australes (currency) which had high volatility. The conversion to USD took the monthly average of the last filing date.
Source: YPF SA, Memories and Financial Statements.

From 1976 and 1989, YPF had a remarkable economic and productive deterioration due to erratic
policymaking and corporate mismanagement. In 1991, Argentina started YPF privatization, and
the company went public. In 1993, partial privatization was consolidated when Argentina sold more
than 50 percent of its holding to private investors, but the government remained in control.
Furthermore, in 1999, Repsol, a private firm from Spanish capital(s), acquired YPF's control of the
corporate decision-making, and the Argentine government remained a minority owner.

During the privatization, YPF improved its profitability and financial health. However, no
significant infrastructure investments were needed to increase production or expand its supply
chain. Consequently, two sides emerged: those who favored neoliberal ideas (President Carlos
Menem was promoting this agenda) or those who thought the government should actively intervene
in the economy. From one perspective, the market took a distressed firm and turned it profitable,
but there was not enough financial room for infrastructure investments in the given scenario. The
private sector was correct in its business decision. However, infrastructure investments lagged, and
other influencers understood that the state was responsible for privatization error because it lost
significant assets to encourage energy policies. For them, infrastructure expansion was more critical
than fiscal deficit and budget balance, and YPF's unprofitability was not a justification for selling
the firm to private investors. In other words, the YPF case became, for the public opinion, a
representation of the application of the Washington Consensus.

The other state-owned companies that were privatized had the same pattern (Agua y Energía
Eléctrica S.E., Empresa Nuclear Argentina de Centrales Eléctricas S.A. ENACE, Gas del Estado
S.E., Hidroeléctrica Norpatagónica S.A. – HIDRONOR, Petropol, Servicios Eléctricos del Gran
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Buenos Aires – SEGBA, and Yacimientos Carboníferos Fiscales - Y.C.F.)45. They became more
productive; however, they didn't have the incentives to invest in significant expansions after
acquisitions. The lack of investments could be easily understood as an expectations mismatch
between the federal government and the private sector. Before reconsidering its strategic planning,
private capital had to experience a decent return of investment. Therefore, the simple idea of
pushing private agents to keep investing for the sake of the public good is entirely
counterproductive. There is an urgent need to align the private and public sectors in a sustainable
growth path in Argentina. Since the government sets the framework for economic activities,
policymakers should improve guidelines' quality to reduce uncertainty levels.

In 2000-01, Argentina's abrupt slowdown and financial crisis showed the government's
inefficiencies in supporting economic stability and managing the correct timing between debt,
growth, and capital allocation.
ENERGY POLICYMAKING DURING THE NESTOR KIRCHNER'S ADMINISTRATION 2003-2007

As briefly mentioned above, Nestor Kirchner took office after intense economic corrections in 2001
and 200246. After that massive deterioration, the new administration experienced a fresh start in
2003. Still, there were many challenges ahead: restructuring debt negotiations with the holdouts,
no trust in the economy, and record low activity levels47. However, the upside for a fast economic
recovery was huge.
During privatizations in the 90s, the only role left for the state was the power to authorize or deny
exports according to domestic supply priorities48. Lacking the capacity to intervene, transnational
companies were at full liberty to decide what and how of the sector and, consequently, the state
relinquished control of the industry's future. This behavior explained the tremendous growth in
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hydrocarbon productivity throughout the decade, as Argentina started to meet the demand in Brazil,
Chile, and Uruguay49 (See the above chart Argentine Historical Primary Energy Balance (MTOE)).
In 2003, although Argentina exported energy due to its surplus, there was an interannual seasonal
gap during winter when domestic energy demand spiked over the local production. To deal with
the deficiencies in the energy supply, Néstor Kirchner approached the Bolivian government (Carlos
Mesa Gisbert 2003-2005) to negotiate a trade agreement to purchase gas. The arrangement between
Argentina and Bolivia was rolled over in 2005 and 2006, until 2026. In this context, Argentina
founded IEASA (Former ENARSA back in 2004) through this commitment. IEASA's primary asset
was the supervision and concessions rights to exploit offshore energy resources (i.e., fossil fuels in
the maritime platform, in the Argentine Sea), and the national state-owned 53% of the company,
provincial governments shared 12%, and the remaining 35% was traded in the stock market 50.
Néstor Kirchner's administration went for a more hybrid ownership structure to avoid historical
mistakes from state-owned firms such as YPF or Gas Argentina.
After the 2001 collapse, the focus of the Kirchner Administration was economic recovery.
Positively, the average economic growth rate from 2003 to 2007 was 8.76% yearly, and energy
production was above the domestic demand from 2003-2007. This fast performance is explained
mainly by unused installed capacity and the energy sector's accumulated productivity in the 90s
(See the above chart Argentine Historical Primary Energy Balance (MTOE)).
Selected Economic Indicators, 2001-2007

Source: Ministry of Economy, Department of Finance and Department of Energy.

ENERGY POLICYMAKING DURING THE CRISTINA KIRCHNER'S ADMINISTRATION 2007-2015

Energy policymaking took more shifts in the Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner presidency. The first
prominent executive order from Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner related to energy was the E.O.
2014/08 in November 2008. This legislation created two programs: Oil Plus and Refining Plus. The
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main goal behind the initiative was to increase oil production and reserves, encourage new
refineries, and expand new ones for more fuel production. Under this legislation, firms had fiscal
benefits to increase production. It consisted of tax credits certificates for those firms that increase
their production and reserves and tax exemptions for those companies that invest in infrastructure51.
As the chart Argentine Historical Primary Energy Balance (MTOE) shows, the oil production
levels did not achieve a high target during Cristina Kirchner's term.

Argentina Energy Balance, USD$ Billions/year

Source: Ministry of Economy, Department of Energy.

In 2009, global markets were suffering from the subprime crisis in the U.S., and credit paralyzed.
The Argentine economy lost traction and grew 4.06% versus the 8.76% average from 2003 to 2007.
For the Argentine energy sector, the 2008-2009 period was the turning point where it lost its energy
surplus. Unfortunately, the Oil Plus and Refining plus programs did not achieve the expected
targets, and while production was stable, imports doubled from 2010 to 2011. Since 2008, the
Argentine economic growth has experienced an intermittent performance (average economic
growth rate from 2012 to 2015 was 0.4%). As a result, the energy sector needed a policy restructure,
and a good trigger came from a sizeable Repsol-YPF oil discovery in 2010 and its research
confirmation from the U.S. Energy Information Administration in 201152.
From 2012 to 2013, Cristina Kirchner reframed the entire energy sector declaring the 'Hydrocarbon
sovereignty' and the energy/hydrocarbons self-sufficiency as a public interest. The same law
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announced the nationalization of 51% of YPF to regain control of the firm after discovering the
shale oil and realizing such as energy upside. Despite the energy as public interest narrative,
Argentina claimed back YPF arguing that Repsol did not invest in infrastructure enough to unlock
Argentina's potential.
There were many interesting perspectives on the YPF takeover decision. Despite there was a
bipartisan bill approval in the congress from the administrations' congressmen and the oposition,
many questioned the government's rush handling of this decision. In fact, after 2008, Argentina had
structural problems maintaining sustainable economic growth. As mentioned above, the economy
was barely growing (the average economic growth rate from 2012 to 2015 was 0.4%), and some
other financial indicators were out of control, such as inflation. The opposition's core discussion
was the lack of fiscal resources to spend on the YPF nationalization as the most prominent firm in
the country. Many others also question the state's new role in the energy sector that claimed its old
active interventionism. Thus, Repsol suited the Argentine government in international courts. N.Y.
was one jurisdiction because YPF SA is listed in the NYSE. At that time, Argentina also had
conflicts with a minority of the holdouts of the defaulted bonds from 2001.

Argentina's timing and forms for the YPF takeover were tragic. After the intervention, Cristina
Kirchner announced agreements between YPF and international groups such as Chevron, Dow, and
Petronas to exploit Vaca Muerta, the main unconventional reservoirs located in the Neuquén Basin.
Vaca Muerta has 30,000 km2, and 12,000 km2 corresponds to the YPF concession. Expectedly,
the chart YPF Price Chart During Cristina Kirchner Term, December 10, 2007, to December 10,
2015, shows that the market did not like the nationalization. It cut millions of dollars in market
capitalization. In detail, the stock worth 40.65 on January 27, 2012, and a week after the
announcement hit a 2012 low at 12.48 on April 19, 2012. Considering some information leaked
before the announcement as the dynamics of an emerging market, the company lost 69.29% of
market value in 3 months. A legend editor, Ricardo Roa from the Clarin53 Newspaper, wrote about
the transaction profitability the government settled for YPF. In his article: YPF y la peor muestra
de la política (YPF and the worse of politics) from January 2021, he pointed out the company value
destruction. For the 50% of YPF, Argentina paid Repsol US$ 5.000 million (despite a pending
settlement for an N.Y. suit). In 2012 the company was worth US$ 10.000 million. Today

53

Clarín is the largest newspaper in Argentina and the second most circulated in the Spanish-speaking world. It was
founded by Roberto Noble in 1945, published by the Clarín Group.
33

(01/20/2021), the company market value is US$ 1.450 million with US$ 8.500 million in
liabilities54.

YPF Price Chart During Cristina Kirchner Term, Dec 10, 2007 to Dec 10, 2015

Source: Bloomberg, prices EOD, NYSE.

Starting in 2014, the early implementation of the Gas Plus promotion program initiated by the
Argentine government sparked a new expansion phase for Argentina's natural gas industry. As a
result, there was an upswing in gas output in Neuquén, as the chart Neuquén's Oil Production, Jan
2014 to May 2018 shows below. In contrast, the recovery of crude oil production volumes only
took hold in 2017 as price controls for domestic oil prices restrained investment enthusiasm from
oil majors who prefer import parity pricing that can be hedged over the long term. Nevertheless,
the Macri government's commitment to converging domestic distillate and crude oil prices with
Brent oil prices served as an impetus for a surge in investment projects in Vaca Muerta. In addition,
Neuquén's state-owned oil company (G&P) was active in conceding farm-outs to local and
international oil and gas firms that require drilling investments in exchange for the approval of
longer-term unconventional concessions. As a result, G&P forged partnerships with Exxon, Shell,
and Wintershall in four unconventional shale oil and gas projects.
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Neuquén’s Oil Production, Jan 2014 to May 2018

Neuquén’s Gas Production, Jan 2014 to May 2018

Source: Neuquén Province Department of Energy.

Source: Neuquén Province Department of Energy.

ENERGY POLICYMAKING DURING THE MAURICIO MACRI'S ADMINISTRATION 2015-2019

The Macri administration had a different political ideology from Cristina Kirchner. Macri was more
market-friendly, and, despite his macroeconomic miscue, the government was determined to bring
Argentina back to the world. His mantra was selling Argentina as a place of significant
opportunities. However, to promote the new Argentina, he considered that the state should stop
major economic interventions. Consequently, the first government action related to energy was
reducing subsidies of major public services. From 2015 to 2019, budget accounts related to GDP
went from 1.8% to 0.9% for electricity, from 0.9% to 0.5% for gas, and from 3% to 1.4% for
hydrocarbons. As a second action, he signed Executive Order 272/2015 that dissolved the Planning
and Strategic Coordination Commission for National Hydrocarbon Investments55. The concept
behind this dissolution was that provinces should oversee the planning and activities the
commission was performing. The shift was so drastic and soon that after seeing its evolution, one
may ask if this action considered that provinces might not have the know-how to absorb this
challenge. For example, in 2017, the federal government had to coordinate production in Vaca
Muerte between provinces, firms, and unions to reactivate the sector. In other words, the
decentralization may have cost time (eventual growth) to the industry. As the chart Neuquén's Gas
Production, Jan 2014 to May 2018 shows, in the first half of 2018, Argentina's overall petroleum
production did not evidence a noticeable recovery (falling -1.1% YoY), following a disappointing
2017 when steep decline rates on convention production helped pull down overall output by -7.3%.
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In Neuquén, the production expanded by +5.1% YoY, thanks largely to shale extraction from Vaca
Muerta.

The provincial royalties are essential to promote Vaca Muerta's competitiveness. Neuquén's local
government collects a 12% royalty on crude oil and natural gas production. In addition, there is an
additional royalty for unconventional production at WTI crude oil prices above US$76-U$78, and
it applies only to the 35-year concessions signed for odd projects. In 2018, 23% of the government's
overall revenues accounted for royalties. In 2015, it was only 16.6%. From a taxation perspective,
the low 12% royalty positions Vaca Muerta as one of the six most attractive oil and gas
opportunities globally. In Eagle Ford, royalties are 20%, and in Bolivia, they are 50% for new
projects. Neuquén incidence in Vaca Muerta is massive. It represents 94% of oil, and 88.8% of gas
in the national share of unconventional production, followed by the Rio Negro, which represents
6.1% of oil and 4.8% of gas56.

During the Macri administration, YPF also looked for opportunities in the regional market. As a
result, YPF signed a landmark 40-year natural gas exploration deal with its Bolivian counterpart,
YPFB, in mid-January 201757. The contract included development in the Charagua block, which is
in the Santa Cruz province of Bolivia. The deal ensured a long-term sustainable supply of natural
gas to Argentina to hedge those cyclical deficits due to demand58.

According to research from the U.S. National Renewable Energy Research Laboratory (NREL), in
2020, Argentina's gross solar resource could amount to as much as 7853 TWh/y, the 11th highest
globally59. On renewable energy, Mauricio Macri pushed the law regulation 27.191/2015 and the
Executive Order 136/2016 that created the Renovar (renew) Program that invited local and
international investors to bid on wind and solar energy projects across the nation. This market niche
never experienced this type of proposal before, and it had significant endorsement because of the
tax benefits and time of the concessions.
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ENERGY POLICYMAKING DURING THE ALBERTO FERNANDEZ'S ADMINISTRATION 2019-2022

In 2020, Argentina produced 480,000 barrels per day (bpd) of oil, of which 134,000 bpd were
exported. While total oil production was down 20,000 bpd compared to 2019, oil exports were up
by 45,000 bpd due to reduced domestic demand related to COVID-19 quarantine measures60.

As soon as Alberto Fernandez took office, he sent a bill to congress for a public emergency law, in
which the sixth article determined the intervention of regulatory entities. ENARGAS and ENRE
have the authority to regulate prices in the energy supply chain. This proposal represented the
anthesis to Macri's ideas about how the energy retail sector should work. Macri believed that the
state should not interfere in energy tariffs, mainly because subsidies create price disruptions and
deficits are not sustainable. In the opposite view, Fernandez thought that the state should oversee
the affordability of energy sources. Despite ideology, Argentina's history and social structure show
that a sudden stop in public services subsidies can drain a big part of the political capital. Firms
would invest in expansion plans only if they see opportunities and profitability. If prices are capped,
firms may not take additional risks.

In May 2020, Argentina implemented internal pricing for crude oil known as barril criollo, which
set oil prices at levels well above those of the international market. This policy was an incentive to
oil and gas firms to increase production and distribution. However, this was a highly costly action
since, in a bearish commodity market, public spending skyrockets in hard currency terms because
the spreads are covered in U.S. dollars. Moreover, since oil and soybeans (and other Agri products
that Argentina exports) use to correlate, there is no natural hedge for those dollars that the state has
to pay for the barril criollo. In October 2020, the President announced the Gas Plan 4, which set
prices with substantial subsidies to producers extending the barril criollo concept to gas.

In late 2020, Alberto Fernández announced the transfer of the Secretary of Energy headquarters to
Neuquén. Despite the change being mainly symbolic, Fernandez's administration reverted the
decentralization of the energy sector encouraged by Macri, and the sector's strategic planning
responsibility returned to the federal government. Furthermore, due to the Covid-19 crisis,
Argentina set a one-time Wealth Tax only to the top 1% wealthiest individuals, and 25% of that tax
collection went to YPF for exploration, development, and exploitation of hydrocarbon deposits,
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confirming the energy sector is one of the biggest hopes for the current government to create hard
currency because of the production potential in Vaca Muerta.

In summary, the Argentine energy sector swung from political interventionism to radical liberalism
from the 90s until the present. Regulations, investments, and planning never found stability besides
extraordinary exceptions. Despite ideologies, most opportunities came through significant
participation of the private sector. Moreover, building trust in the investment community is a must,
and creating the right environment for private firms does not mean high deregulation. Private
ventures look for economic stability, controlled inflation, and of course, good timing. The
Argentine energy sector must focus on greater competition while delivering to demand in the local
supply chain.
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CHAPTER 3: ENERGY MARKET AND PLAYERS

Understanding Vista Oil and Gas market is important because it implicitly refers to the potential of
Vaca Muerta and the Argentine energy sector. As this research referred to in chapter 1, Vaca Muerta
has been recognized as one of the world's largest oil and gas shale reserves, and Vista's main market
is Vaca Muerta. After five years in YPF (2012-2016), Gallucio, Vista Oil and Gas CEO, visualized
that the industry would require more competition and players to fulfill the supply chain demand in
Argentina and globally. By the start of 2017, the most relevant players were YPF, Chevron, Shell,
Petronas, Tecpetrol, and Dow61.

In the Argentine energy sector, the infrastructure is the most strategic condition to unlock the
production and export potential. Under current conditions, Argentine production cannot meet the
demand in its winters, and it cannot accumulate the surplus from other seasons because it lacks
midstream infrastructure (storages). Vaca Muerta is a massive natural resource that requires routes,
pipelines, trains, stock containers, and ports with the right conditions to transport oil and gas.
Despite Vaca Muerta's formation prospects, infrastructure constraints could limit production
growth dramatically. The gas output capacity from pipelines is critical for domestic and
international demand. At present, there are three gas pipelines able to export gas from Neuquén,
yielding a volume of approximately 92.9 MMcmd. In 2019, basin production averaged 84.2
MMcmd, peaking at 94.2 MMcmd in the southern winter when seasonal demand increases.
Additional gas output may only increase as long as local demand meets equlibrium without new
pipelines.

A few options have been on the table to expand pipeline capacity. In 2019, a proposal suggested an
$800 million construction, 500 km pipeline connecting the Neuquén Basin with Buenos Aires;
however, the project has faced a series of setbacks and continues to be on hold because of covid19. In 2020, the federal government also pitched a $4.9 billion, 2,000 km pipeline to Brazil that
would connect the Neuquén Basin with Porto Alegre. Initial discussions on the latter pipeline are
ongoing62.
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In the current picture, Argentina’ s lack of infrastructure and the chronically poor business climate
failed to lure enough spending in the Vaca Muerta shale patch. Moreever, the lack of economic
incentives delayed the construction of pipelines needed to bring gas from the remote Patagonia
region to industrial hubs and urban centers. As a result, instead of becoming the shale powerhouse
it had hoped to be, Argentina has become a major cyclical importer of LNG from expensive
markets, as shipping data compiled by Bloomberg show63.

Argentina has the very particular skill of wasting historical opportunities, such as the war between
Russia and Ukraine that has taken global dimensions, particularly in the energy markets. As crude
oil and natural gas prices have surged exponentially in an unanticipated global context of inflation,
the Argentine political class spent most of the 2022 first quarter trying to figure out how to avoid
default and close a deal with the International Monetary Fund, given an eternal lack of hard
currency64.
YPF AND PAN AMERICAN ENERGY, THE BIG PLAYERS

According to the Argentine Secretary of Energy statistics, Vista became the third oil producer in
Argentina by the end of 2021, behind YPF and Pan American Energy65.

YPF is the most important player in Vaca Muerta. YPF is Argentina's leading oil and gas firm. The
company covers 13.000 m2 of land from the 30.000 m2 available in the Vaca Muerta Basin, and it
is responsible for channeling the most significant investments in the area. Argentina uses YPF as
an instrument to articulate technology, capital, and know-how through partnerships with global
players such as Chevron, ExxonMobil, and Total S.A66. As YPF discovered the reserves, it was
also the first investor to start developing this opportunity. However, international investors saw that
Vaca Muerta was a massive business that required exceptional infrastructure spending. Therefore,
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they would only commit to the opportunity if Argentina proposed a suitable framework and a
significant initial investment before going with CAPEX67 investments.

In 2021, YPF invested US$2.7 billion, and in 2022, YPF plans to disburse US$3.7 billion to scale
infrastructure and operations. Around US$2.8 billion will go to the upstream, of which US$1.6
billion will be for activities in Vaca Muerta. Sergio Affronti, the CEO of YPF, commented in an
interview for EconoJournal: "the growth in production in Vaca Muerta was really surprising,
especially due to the jump in gas production. In unconventional, we grew twice as much as in 2020.
We produced 10 MMm3/day and jumped to almost 20 MMm3/day in just six months under the Gas
Plan. The growth in oil production in Vaca Muerta was 60%"68. The Gas Plan implied direct
investment from the Argentine Ministry of Economy; however, the policy is an extension of the
barril criollo to the gas sector. In this context, the production growth has relied on subsidies from
public sources, which had nothing to do with the YPF cash flow or financing options. An example
of these public sources is the one-time tax to the 'ultra-rich' during covid to fund the national budget
and investment in YPF operation69. This type of capital injection and cheap financing from the
Argentine government is a double-edged sword. On one hand, YPF has enough funding to play the
leading role in the energy sector and make the heavy investments that the industry needs in
infrastructure. On the other hand, YPF's financial package has not been enough to stabilize energy
delivery in the Argentine winter. Argentine taxpayers have one of the highest tax burdens
globally70, and during high-energy demand, Argentinians are used to suffering power outages or
inefficient delivery to households. As the Electric Power Demand MWh chart shows below,
Argentina has higher demand from the retail sectors, of air conditioning in summers and heating in
winters. Additionally, the charts also shows how the industrial and commercial sectors never
increase their consumtions due to energy scarcity, which also affects the upside of the economy
because the productive sector knows there is no more energy to increase its output.
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Electric Power Demand MWh, 2019, Rate Category
Yellow is Retail, Dark Blue is Industrial, Light Blue is Commercial.

Source: Secretary of Energy, Ministry of Economy.

Pan American Energy (PAE) is the second biggest player in Vaca Muerta. This firm was a joint
venture between Bridas and Amoco Corp (now British Petroleum) in 1997. The importance of Pan
American Energy in Argentina lies in the Bulgheroni Family, which is in charge of its management
and is one of the wealthiest families in Argentina. Bulgheroni represents a symbol for the Argentine
private sector that has been getting smaller relative to the public sector in terms of employment and
GDP in recent decades.

After the 2001 crisis, Argentina's society blamed its private sector for the socio-economic
imbalances and financial breakdown. Moreover, the Kirchner administrations increased State
interventionism, and as taxes went higher, employment costs diminished the potential of
businesses. More than two decades after the 2001 crash, the PAE's leading role with YPF in
developing Vaca Muerta was a harmonic message to the international community that there was an
alignment between the private and public sectors in Argentina. 'We have been investing heavily for
the last decade in the basin, and the investment is paying off. It is now ready to accelerate its
potential', said Marcos Bulgheroni, whose company is a prominent player in Vaca Muerta, with 4
million cubic meters per day of gas produced in Argentina's Neuquén basin in 201971. Marcos
Bulgheroni is the Pan American Energy CEO and at the IHS Markit's CERAWeek conference in
2021 said: "Now the big question mark is how do we fulfill this potential by connecting the local
market first with the regional market, but also with the international gas market." This Vaca Muerta
conceptualization is the right approach to develop its potential, and the market structure and
economic policies must embrace harmonic public-private cooperation. Argentina needs to plan and
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build more LNG capacity to accelerate the development of the Argentine energy sector and its
exports. Consequently, Bulgheroni also said that companies participating in the giant shale play are
ready to accelerate investment as drilling efficiency and potential output rise. But, the government
must secure a stable regulatory framework and access to financing and hard currency.
A MARKET OVERVIEW

The Oil Production by Company in Argentina (barrel/d), December 2021 chart shows the market
share of the oil production in Argentina. The chart reveals a YPF domination that correlates with
its historical importance in the Argentine energy sector. Pan American Energy represents almost
half of YPF's print, and Chevron, Vista, Petronas, Shell, and CGC are similar but far from YPF and
Pan American Energy.
Oil Production by Company in Argentina (barrel/d), December 2021

Source: Secretary of Energy, Ministry of Economy.

On the other hand, the Argentine Oil Production by Province excluding Vaca Muerta (barrel
thousands/d), December 2021 chart shows an interesting view of the investment location in
Argentina (see chart below). Vaca Muerta has outperformed the rest of the provinces-regions in
production (the province references exclude Vaca Muerta as in Neuquén, for example). Moreover,
Vaca Muerta has beat production growth since 2013. No other place stopped this new basin from
leading the market.
Argentina's opportunity competes with other regional energy projects in international corporations'
budget allocation. However, it is not just competing with other places such as Colombia, Brazil, or
Guyana. Argentina is not an investment-grade country, so firms cannot articulate their cash with
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financing options because interest rate costs get particularly expensive. In Argentina, this problem
is cross-sector.
Argentine Oil Production by Province excluding Vaca Muerta (barrel thousands/d), December 2021

Source: Secretary of Energy, Ministry of Economy.

If we consider the number of barrels per active well (which can be a metric to observe efficiency),
Vista Oil & Gas has the best performance in the market. In this aspect, Vista beats YPF and
Panamerican Energy. ExxonMobil and Shell have extraordinary indicators, but Exxon only has
four wells and Shell 75. As a reference, YPF has 11.658, Pan American Energy has 4.615, and
Vista has 776.
Vaca Muerta acreage, with API degrees

Source: Secretary of Energy, Ministry of Economy and Vista Investor Relation Presentation.
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The Vaca Muerta acreage, with API degrees map shows the distribution of wells by firms in Vaca
Muerta. From that reference, it is easier to see the importance of YPF and its infrastructure
investment. It is not a coincidence that YPF is near almost every firm that has a presence in the
basin because partnerships between YPF and international players have been a policy since the
beginning72.
Production by Active wells in Vaca Muerta (efficiency ratio), January 2022

Source: Secretary of Energy, Ministry of Economy.

THE DESIGN OF THE ARGENTINEAN ENERGY MARKET

Domestic policies, supply chain shareholders, and local and international opportunities are strategic
elements that set functions in a market design, and their behavior unlocks economic potential.
Emerging markets (EM) are more dysfunctional than markets in developed economies. Each EM
has its own characteristics depending on its location, legal framework, and socio-economic
resources. For the Argentine energy sector case, the country has a long history with the
development of YPF and the oil and gas from the Patagonia region. However, regulations did not
find stability and drove away strategic international firms from Argentina. Despite inconsistencies,
the country achieved energy self-sufficiency in 1989 but ultimately lost it in 2010, surviving the
2001 crisis. However, the Kirchners' master plan in 2012-2015 that involved the nationalization of
YPF did not bring back energy autonomy, and during winters, the Argentine government spent a
massive amount of dollars to import energy.

After the 2001 crisis, Regulations in the upstream chain did not stabilize exploration and production
for the following years. Moreover, as this research covered in chapter 3, they intensified fiscal
deficits and did not achieve the infrastructure goals that the sector needed to unlock its potential.
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In detail, Emergency Law No 25,561 (from 2002 to 2017) gave the government the authority to set
wellhead gas prices, especially for the residential sector and thermal power plants, much below
import parity price. Moreover, it suspended the pass-through price mechanism for distributors
serving residential and small consumers, as the 'emergency rules' did not allow any increase in
consumers' tariff rates73. This policy made energy prices highly cheap in Argentina because the
government paid the cost that consumers did not. In addition, capital controls and an intervened
exchange rate market made international corporations avoid Argentina as a significant recipient of
CAPEX investments.

Uncertainties generated by the regulatory changes and the forced low gas prices reduced
investments in exploration to a minimum and caused a significant drop in reserves. Natural gas
production capacity was insufficient to meet internal and external requirements. The strong increase
in demand, encouraged by low gas prices, led to the gradual suspension of exports to guarantee
domestic supply. There was an increase in alternative liquid fuels for electricity generation during
the whole year (winter and summer) and additional industrial consumption restrictions in winter.
These events led to the commissioning of two LNG import terminals (Bahia Blanca and Escobar),
respectively, in 2008 and 2012, increasing pipeline imports from Bolivia and importing liquid fuels
(diesel and fuel oil)74.

In 2013, as oil and gas imports increasingly burdened the Argentine's finances, the government
decided to create the "Plan Gas," where producers committed to increasing production above an
adjusted baseline would receive incentives paid by the Treasury75. Consequently, YPF started a
campaign to develop the Vaca Muerta shale formation, which benefited from "Plan Gas" incentives.
YPF was not alone. Chevron was the first international partner that agreed to explore and produce
in Vaca Muerta. Dow and Petronas completed the list of leading global players that started the first
activities with YPF from 2012 to 201476.

Following the inauguration of President Macri in December 2015, the Ministry of Energy focused
on the new 'normalization' of prices and tariffs by providing economic incentives for the
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Roberto Carnicer and Ieda Gomes. Will Argentina Become a Relevant Gas Exporter? The Oxford Institute for
Energy Studies. May 2021. OIES PAPER: NG 167. ISBN 978-1-78467-175-4.
74 Roberto Carnicer and Ieda Gomes. Will Argentina Become a Relevant Gas Exporter? The Oxford Institute for
Energy Studies. May 2021. OIES PAPER: NG 167. ISBN 978-1-78467-175-4.
75 In 2012, President Cristina Kirchner re-nationalised YPF, which was previously acquired by Repsol in 1995, laiming
“lack of investment in exploration and production”.
76 Vista Oil & Gas. Investors Relations. Vaca Muerta trends and perspectives Vista’s operational update. Feb 4, 2021.
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development of unconventional resources and a gradual return to the gas exports ideal. As a result,
Macri's administration encouraged a more aggressive development of Vaca Muerta's potential
through the generation of internal and external demand, the mothballing of the LNG import
terminal located in Bahía Blanca, and by promoting a scenario where Argentina would become an
exporter of LNG in the medium term. Economic incentives for unconventional production in Vaca
Muerta added volumes to the domestic market. In addition, regulations regarding the "midstream"
encouraged the construction of some of the infrastructure necessary for Vaca Muerta production to
reach new market records. However, in 2019, the government abandoned economic incentives for
new investments in unconventional output due to macroeconomic difficulties. The prospect of
increasing LNG imports again prompted the government to create a new price incentive plan,
announced in late 2020.

The financial crisis and the presidential elections of 2019 caused great uncertainty about the
maintenance of the economic rules in the sector. As a result, companies put a brake on investments,
a situation aggravated by the pandemic. Upon his inauguration, President Alberto Fernandez
maintained the freeze on gas prices as he faced the additional challenges posed by the renegotiation
of Argentina's debt and the strict lockdown measures in the wake of COVID-19.

As a result of the factors mentioned above, from August 2019 to October 2020, there was a
continuous fall in the number of fracture stages in unconventional gas production. In June 2020,
gas production dropped 12% year on year, whereas imports from Bolivia, Chile, and LNG reached
a record of 73 MMm3/day. As a result, investment in the upstream dropped from USD 6.9 Billion
in 2019 to USD 2.0 Billion in 2020, affecting the domestic supply for the winter of 202177.

On exports and imports, the Gas Act establishes that (i) imports of natural gas are authorized
without prior trade, while (ii) exports of natural gas must, in each case, be authorized by the
Executive Power. Export authorizations are granted to the extent that domestic supply is not
affected. Under this regulation, energy firms depend exclusively on the State to export and produce
the hard currency that would ultimately print the return on investments the firms are looking for.
Considering that most of the upstream supply chain is dollarized by international standards,
generating revenue in pesos and having significant limitations on hard currency purchases
disincentivized companies to make new investments.
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Despite investments in Vaca Muerta and its market development, Vista and its peers still have a
long way to go to unlock this basin's real potential, and government policies have a significant
responsibility in this process. For example, YPF's leading role in Vaca Muerta has been important
but lacks efficiency since regulations generate price disruption, impacting profitability and
financial sustainability in the YPF vertical integration (upstream, midstream, and downstream). In
other words, intense and volatile regulations affecting different prices in the energy supply chain
have failed to develop Vaca Muerta. Moreover, with oil prices over US$ 100, Argentina will import
gas in the winter of 2022 (May-August), and it is far from taking advantage of the reorganization
of the global energy supply due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

In other markets, the Permian Basin is growing in record mode (which was considered by Vista's
CEO as a direct competitor because of its geological characteristics in an interview for Bloomberg
in 2019 ), as a total of 904 horizontal drilling permits were awarded in April 2022 in the shale patch
that lies beneath Texas and New Mexico. Artem Abramov, Rystad Energy's head of shale research,
commented that Permian's well permits record clearly signals that those operators in the basin are
kicking into high gear on their development plans, positioning for a significant ramp-up of activity
level. Moreover, it foreshadows a significant increase in supply capacity from early 202378.

In Brazil, for example, the ministry of energy and mining forecasted a 10% increase in oil and gas
production for 202279, and Iran's oil production just returned to the same level as prior to the
reimposition of sanctions in 2018 when the U.S. withdrew from a nuclear deal80. Despite
differences between Argentina and Brazil or Iran and even Permian, it is crucial to understand that
Vaca Muerta is integrated into a global supply chain and competes with historical producers with
a better experience in surfing opportunities in the energy sector. Therefore, Argentina should learn
from other countries' history and expertise to design the best condition for producers and other
market participants to ensure effective results.
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CHAPTER 4: VISTA OIL AND GAS, COMPANY PROFILE AND UPSIDE
Vista Oil and Gas is an Argentinean independent energy company with its principal assets in Vaca
Muerta, the biggest shale oil and gas play outside the United States. The company focuses on
identifying, acquiring, and developing oil and gas fields in Latin America, primarily in Argentina
and Mexico. In 2017, the company went public in Mexico through a SPAC process when they
raised USD 650 million and used the capital to acquire two firms with full operating platforms in
Argentina. According to the Corporate Finance Institute, a special purpose acquisition company
(SPAC) is a corporation formed for the sole purpose of raising investment capital through an initial
public offering (IPO). Such a business structure allows investors to contribute money towards a
fund, which is then used to acquire one or more unspecified businesses to be identified after the
IPO81. With the capital raised from the SPAC, Vista bought assets in Vaca Muerta from Pampa
Energy and Bajada de Palo Oeste from Pluspetrol to develop 550 solid wells over 134.000 acres in
Vaca Muerta. Furthermore, Vista proposes an investment thesis of leveraging the cash flow from
conventional oil & gas businesses to increase CAPEX82 (buildings, vehicles, equipment, land, etc),
and production in the area.

Since Vista developed as a SPAC, it is crucial to understand who is behind the firm because the
management team is the cornerstone for those investors that fund a merger or acquisition. Vista's
SPAC based its success on its experienced management. This fact also reflects the importance of
YPF and its management experience from 2012 to 2016. Miguel Galuccio, a former YPF CEO, is
the founder and CEO of Vista and was responsible for putting the team together. Galuccio is an
Argentine petroleum engineer from the Institute of Technology of Buenos Aires who served as
President of Schlumberger Production Management after working in the holding since 1999. Vista's
Director of Finance is Pablo Vera, a former executive from YPF, and former management
consultant in McKinsey, and an investment banker in Credit Swiss, New York. Juan Garoby is the
Chief Operating Officer with 20 years of experience in exploration and production (E&P) in YPF,
Baker Hughes, and Schlumberger. Additionally, Alejandro Cherñacov is the Investor Relations
Officer with more than ten years of E&P strategy, portfolio management, and investor relations
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CFI, Special Purpose Acquisition Company (SPAC). Resources, Strategy. Link:
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82 CAPEX is the money an organization or corporate entity spends to buy, maintain, or improve its fixed assets, such as
buildings, vehicles, equipment, or land. It is considered a capital expenditure when the asset is newly purchased or
when money is used towards extending the useful life of an existing asset.
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experience in YPF and a small-cap Canada-listed E&P company. Vera, Garoby, Cherñacov are
also co-founders and partners like Galluccio but with smaller participation as shareholders.

Vista's board of directors also has a world-class reputation and strong corporate governance with a
majority independent composition. Representing the shareholders, Vista has five board members
with vast experience worldwide: Kenneth Ryan, Susan L. Segal, Mauricio Doehner Cobian,
Anthony Lim, and Mark Bly. In detail, Ryan is a partner at Riverstone and Capital Strategies. Segal
is a former president and General Director of Americas Societies or Council of the Americas with
thirty years of experience in the Latin American private sector and other emerging markets.
Doehner Cobian has been a well-known senior executive in CEMEX since 1996. Lim is a former
executive and current advisor in the Singaporean investment fund GIC. Finally, Bly has more than
thirty years of experience in the oil and gas industry, where he served as a senior executive in
British Petroleum.
Vista's Organizational Structure

Mexico

Entities
Concessions

Argentina
Source: Vista Oil and Gas Annual Report 2020.

In 2017, Vista decided to set up its holding in Mexico DF instead of New York. Pablo Vera and
Alejandro Chernacov explained in the interview: 'Los SPACS como vehículos de inversión
disruptivos: El Caso de Vista Oil & Gas' (SPACS as disruptive investment instruments: Vista Oil
& Gas) for the finance conference in Torcuato Di Tella University that the main reason why they
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chose Mexico was because of the influence of one of its main investors: Riverstone Holdings.
Despite Mexico having no experience in SPACs in the energy sector, the Mexican energy reform
in 2016 reframed the industry, and many international funds opened offices in the country to
leverage opportunities. In meeting with investors, Vista found that Mexican capital markets had
enough depth, and AFOREs83 were able to back the SPAC instrument that Galuccio and his team
had in mind84.

Since this research is about reinventing opportunities for Argentina, it is crucial to understand why
neither Buenos Aires nor Neuquén was even an option to set up the holding. First, Argentina does
not have the capital markets depth or liquidity to raise the target that Vista was planning. Second,
Argentina's legal institutions are complex and tend to experience multiple changes in short periods
of time, meaning that regulations are inconsistent, and the business environment rules are always
changing. This includes high regulations for the private sector and changes in the tax system. Third,
Argentina's economic policy does not guarantee stability, so firms are historically exposed to
capital flow and FX restrictions. Finally, financial country risk is higher in Argentina than in
Mexico, so access to credit makes a safer location a better destination.
Vista’s organizational structure explains a historical disagreement between the private sector and
the government in Argentina. The country is seen as a great place for business opportunities because
of its natural resources, human capital, and decent development level to compete internationally in
some areas. However, the chaotic political organization. In other words, most investors see
Argentina as a short-term, high-risk investment, where investors repatriate returns as soon as they
are available. Investors perceive Argentina as a very risky environment, and they demand high
performance to match the potential downside. Furthermore, risk management makes investors cash
out profits from Argentina when businesses dispose liquidity available to be transferred to the
headquarters. Unfortunately for the country, the model is a trap for economic development, and
no firms would change the short-term focus under Argentina's current economic and legal
framework.
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Retirement Funds Administrators (Spanish: Administradoras de Fondos para el Retiro, abbreviated AFORE) are
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VISTA'S COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGES AND STRENGTHS

Argentina always had intrinsic potentialities that offered an optimistic future for risk-takers.
Nevertheless, opportunities need to prove a business environment stability. Argentina must have
enough stability for corporate planning, and players should embrace productivity and articulate
their supply chain with international markets. Argentina could reinvent its present and break its
past socio-economic performance from past decades. Vista's strategy to articulate international
investors and opportunities in the Argentina energy sector proved to be highly effective and should
set an example to emulate.

As Galuccio pointed out in an interview for Bloomberg in July 2019, when Vista Oil & Gas was
listed on the NYSE85, the firm had two main advantages. First, the management team learned from
the US shale oil revolution, especially from the Permian Basin. The senior management team
worked and managed teams in diverse aspects of the supply chain in the US shale oil industry. They
also built an advisory team on the board with significant exposure to the US energy sector. So, the
US shale oil industry experience became a learning curve of lessons for Vaca Muerta. Secondly,
Galuccio highlighted an apparent beneficial land distribution system for drilling in Argentina,
which explains how the government organizes the areas for energy production. In the interview,
Vista's CEO also commented on the technical difference between concessions and leases. In the
US, firms lease locations and companies have to drill to secure the land space in the appropriate
location. Therefore, when prices go down, part of the issue with shale oil is that firms have to keep
investing to make the location available for future opportunities. On the other hand, Argentina gives
firms 35 years-concessions that help them to plan wells' development easier.

Vista's management team recognizes competitive strengths that put themselves in a better position
to perform and innovate activities for the projects in the near future. In other words, Vista’s
advantages have six aspects: 1- High-margin conventional assets; 2- Prime Vaca Muerta shale
acreage; 3- Large inventory of oil-weighted drilling locations supporting sustainable growth; 4High degree of operatorship providing flexibility and maximization of returns; 5- Lean and agile
organization; and 6- Experienced management and professional team.

Alix Steel interview to Miguel Galuccio for Bloomberg Markets. July 2019. “Vista Oil & Gas CEO Says Vaca
Muerta Is Here to Compete With Permian”. Link: https://youtu.be/YUaLObmgLDg
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First, Vista increased its margins on conventional assets by consistently reducing the operating
costs of daily production from 2018 to 2020 by controlling costs with a new contracting model and
a strong focus on creating unconventional production growth with the existing cost base.
Maintaining and enhancing these assets provided Vista with low-risk, high-margin cash flows,
allowing the firm to partially fund the development of our shale oil assets in the Vaca Muerta
formation from their own cash flows.

Second, the prime Vaca Muerta shale acreage gives Vista's block locations a very convenient spot
since its concessions and assets are surrounded by blocks in which other operators have conducted
successful pilots and are in full-field development. Vista's exposure to geological and operational
risk is therefore reduced due to the successful pilots and developments from the surrounding
concessions.
Third, Vista has a significant inventory in the location targeting concessions within its core
development acreage, which provides the firm with over 11 years of drilling inventory86. However,
Vista also plans to expand its drilling inventories by testing additional stacked pay zones, such as
the Upper, Mid, and Lower Carbonate. In addition to reducing well spacing in the Bajada del Palo
Oeste block and further delineating Vista's acreage in the Bajada del Palo Este and Águila Mora
blocks (see references in the picture below on the Neuquina Basin Blocks). Additionally, Vista
performs studies aiming to improve the oil recovery factor of the conventional assets they operate
in Argentina through in-fill and appraisal drilling and secondary recovery projects, given that the
oil recovery factor of such assets is lower than the average 15% recovery factor observed in the
analogous on-shore field with a solution gas drive-drainage mechanism.

86
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July 2019.
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Neuquina Basin Blocks

Source: Vista Oil & Gas, SAB de CV. Form F-1 Registration Statement.

Fourth, Vista has a high degree of operatorship, meaning that they do not have to outsource many
aspects of drilling and production like other players in the area. Consequently, since Vista operates
most of its assets, capital, and expenses without outsourcing any strategic process of its operations,
Vista has operational flexibility, and it also has a better upside to maximize returns. Vista adjusts
capital expenditures and financing options by balancing spending and planning production
according to oil prices and other factors.

Fifth, Vista set up a packed and efficient team with a flat and lean organizational structure that
supports a rapid and effective decision-making process. The flat organization allowed the
management team to work closely with operations, prioritizing shareholders' returns while
committing safe and security standards.

Finally, Vista's experienced management and professional team is an advantage since it has vast
experience executing complex projects worldwide. The team also knows the culture and has
stronger networking in the Argentina energy sector due to former connections with YPF.

Vista Oil and Gas is particularly interesting because its main advantages and strengths are crucial
in the energy sector. In the next chapter, Vista Oil and Gas: Market and peers, the research
contextualizes the competitiveness against other operators and essential players in the industry.
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Moreover, the study will evolve to consider Vista Oil & Gas in the big picture and its impact on
Argentine economic development.
VISTA STRATEGY AND UPSIDE

Vista Oil and Gas has declared that its primary business strategy is to increase shareholders' value
through strong cash flow generation, development of Vaca Muerta acreage, and maintaining a
leading operator role in the sector. Furthermore, the company also considers that preserving
financial flexibility and pursuing profitable growth in Latin America are foundational aspects of its
mission87.

For Vista, the business that generates most of the cash flow is conventional production, and
according to their plan, they use that cash to fund the development of shale acreage. Therefore,
maximizing efficiency in conventional production will increase cash flow expansion, and
consequently, Vista will reinvest in shale acreage (more assets) to extend business operations in
Vaca Muerta.
VIST Price Chart from 2019 to 2022

Covid sell off
Average trend
after IPO

Global energy winter

Winter extension in EM

Oil and gas renaissance
due to economic recovery
and geopolitical risks

Source: Bloomberg, prices EOD, NYSE.

The VIST Price Chart from 2019 to 2022 shows VIST stock settling at a 5.5-8 price before the
Covid hit. After the pandemic sell-off, global energy firms entered an intense pricing winter
because of government incentives to clean energy. Moreover, the effect was even longer in
emerging markets with higher risk, and the pricing reaction differed.
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Despite the rise of clean energy, the economic recovery and geopolitical risks were the main drivers
for the oil and gas firm's renaissance in the second half of 2021 and early 2022. The new wave of
commodities and energy demand came with a painful thorn for Argentina and its energy sector.
The country spent more than a decade trying to establish a reliable economic ecosystem for the
intense infrastructure investments for Vaca Muerta without remarkable success. Firms have
executed activities with high inflation, low economic growth, and high local interest rates until
today, and there is no sign of a real economic policy change. Thus, for the private sector, debt is
expensive; it is hard to forecast and make strategic planning due to inflation and luck of economic
growth. As Argentina's economic history has taught us, economic potentiality can always give
firms a chance no matter how complex the circumstance may be. Vaca Muerta's upside is too
interesting to turn down, and that is the reason why leading international players have operations
there. A turn of events in regulations or economic stability could skyrocket investment profitability.

Vista has fully understood this opportunity in its long-term commitment to Vaca Muerta.
Nevertheless, the upside comes with a risk attached. Vista was conservative as regards the amount
of capital it raised in consecutive investment rounds, and it has been able to find a proper balance
to expand through debt and cash generated from operations. All in all, Vista has managed to become
the third-largest crude producer in Argentina and the second-largest shale oil operator in the
country.

In December 2021, Vista announced its 2022-2026 strategic plan to expand its operations and
provide guidance to investors with low-cost and low-carbon world-class performance foundations.
In the plan, the firm prioritized investments in Vista's flagship project in Baja del Palo Oeste, where
the company expects to increase its annual drilling and completion pace from 20 new wells tied-in
in 2021 to 40 in 202688.

By 2026, the strategic plan proposed to increase total production by 80Mboe/d, more than doubling
the 2021 total production estimate, and to improve the adjusted EBITDA margin above 65%, more
than 7 p.p. above the 2021 estimate. In addition, the company announced its aspiration to become
net zero in scope 1 and 2 greenhouse gas emissions in 2026 by the reduction of the carbon footprint
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Investor Relations. Vista Oil & Gas. Strategic Plan 2022-2026. Presentation in a live webcast hosted by Miguel
Galuccio, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, and other members of the management team.
December 2021.
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in its operations with the planned launch of its own portfolio of Nature Based Solutions ("NBS")
to remove CO2 from the atmosphere, through the implementation of forest and soil carbon
sequestration projects. Furthermore, Vista plans to reduce its gross debt a 33%*89 from 2022 until
2026 by increasing production and selling energy to new markets.

Vista planned to deploy US$ 2.3 billion in 2022-26. However, geopolitical tensions have changed
the landscape of the energy sector. In February 2022, since the start of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict,
commodities, especially oil, met new highs due to sanctions on Russia. After the Russian invasion,
Russia reduced its export to the west, and oil prices rebalanced opportunities for many global
energy players. As a concrete example of this rebalance, Vista oil forecasted a 60 $/bbl realized
crude oil price in real terms in its strategy plan (December 2021). The Brent closed at 110/bbl on
March 29, 2022. So, the new price references and geopolitical risk created significant market
uncertainties about the potential for oil supply disruptions. These events occur against a backdrop
of low oil inventory and persistent upward oil price pressures. Global oil inventories have fallen
steadily since mid-2020, and inventory draws averaged 1.8 million barrels per day (b/d) from the
third quarter of 2020 (3Q20) through the end of 202190.

Vista Oil & Gas is an ideal business model in the private sector that is perfectly compatible with
the primary macroeconomic needs that Argentina currently has. Given that Vista's operations are
focused on Vaca Muerta, experts pointed out that the company is the best corporate representation
of the shale formation opportunity91. The company can massively attract FDI to turn it into energy
production and infrastructure projects for gas distribution and transportation. Moreover, Vista
exports a large part of its production, making it a hard currency generator in an economy that badly
needs a genuine supply of dollars. Looking forward to Vista's future, the Argentine political risks
appear relevant in the equation, considering that most of Vista's investments are allocated there. In
this context, the company's financial position and results of operations are sensitive to exchange
rate volatility. During the years ended December 31, 2021, and 2020, the ARS depreciated by about
22% and 41%, respectively92. Despite energy companies enjoying a structural dollarized balance
sheet due to their output and the standardization of its equipment and CAPEX, Vista also has assets
and cash flow in ARS mainly from local transactions.
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* The 33% is a calculation from the Strategic Plan 2022-2026 since by the end of 2021 the debt levels were at 600
million and the company has established to reduce gross debt to 400 million.
90 US Energy Information Administration. Short-Term Energy Outlook. Analysis & Projections. March 2022.
91 Vaca Muerta Big Picture Analyzer: The Macroeconomic Game Changer. Balanz Capital. July 2019.
92 Vista Oil & Gas, Quarterly Report For The Period Ended December 31, 2021.
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Vista's strategy plan from December 2021 faces new circumstances due to geopolitical risk and a
more complex trade and global inflation environment. Moreover, despite a massive upside since
current prices are far higher than Vista estimated, there are also higher risks in supply chain issues,
higher interest rates, and an eventual new regulatory framework that could produce a more
problematic future for Vista. In such a case, Vista will encounter a much more complex
environment in global markets, plus higher risk in Argentine economy, which will increase the
need of a higher collaboration between the private sector and the government policymaking to
avoid setbacks that could exports and economic growth. Nevertheless, Vista had beneficial market
estimates even before the recent increase in the oil price. Moreover, agreements with large
companies, like Trafigura and Shell93, will expand Vista's capacity to improve financing
opportunities and include technology to make operations more efficient. As this chapter considered,
Vista has a very experienced team and a real potential to become a leading firm regionally. If
Argentina creates the right incentives for growth, the firm could find an exceptional upside to make
an impact internationally.
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CHAPTER 5: ARGENTINEAN ECONOMIC POLICY:
MISTAKES AND LESSONS
This chapter studies the impact of public policies in a variety of fields such us economics, finance,
and energy distribution since 2003.

The research covers each government action after a brief

contextualization. This section analyzes key trends in economic policy decision-making in
Argentina and questions whether there were patterns of structural failures – etc. Consequently, this
section looks for patterns and common mistakes that may represent a structural problem in
policymaking. Finally, the chapter identifies the main lessons and takeaways for future guidelines
and government planning.

When actions are not executed with holistic and detailed control, wrong policies can create new
problems94 and unintended consequences95. As Eyal Frank in the University of Chicago explains
in his course: Lessons From Policies That Went Wrong, behavioral responses of those affected by
the policy can reduce its effectiveness and even result in outcomes that are the opposite of the
original goal96. For Argentina, one of the most vulnerable emerging economies97, modeling future
scenarios from the lessons learned in previous mistakes is crucial. As the Risk Ranking in Emerging
Markets chart shows, many factors produce economic vulnerability indicators that could be
contrasted between many countries around the world.

Juan Carlos Suárez Serrato. “Unintended Consequences of Eliminating Tax Havens”. NBER Working Paper No.
24850 (2018)
95 Nina Buchmann et al. “Throwing the Baby out with the Drinking Water: Unintended Consequences of Arsenic
Mitigation Efforts in Bangladesh”. NBER Working Paper No. 25729 (2019)
96 Eyal Frank, Lessons From Policies That Went Wrong, PPHA 31810.
97 Vulnerability Ranking, Indexes, Bloomberg Economics. 2021.
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Risk Ranking in Emerging Markets, Print from Dec 13, 2021

Source: Bloomberg Economics.

Each driver presented in the chart is also a sum of elements. Still, current accounts, external debt,
government debt, reserve coverage, and governance are the most significant indicators of how
wrong policymaking increases the economic vulnerability levels.

In Argentina, the number of errors in policymaking planning and execution is massive, especially
after 192598. Since this chapter's framework focuses on relevant Argentine policy and the
sustainability of its investments, this research works on four cases that had a significant impact on
economic growth and on the energy sector development. First, the chapter covers the barril criollo
policy and its ramification in the supply chain's prices. Since oil is an input and energy source of
sectors across the whole economy, government intervention in prices created a significant price
disruption. In essence, the barril criollo is a subsidy to incentivize production when prices go down
in international markets. For example, if the international price goes below 'x', the government will
pay the producer the spread between the barril criollo price and the international reference.
Moreover, Argentina also has a large fiscal spending subsidizing the retail sector when international
prices are high to help affordability. As a result, market dynamics create a costly structure, and
energy prices stress fiscal accounts either way. Second, this research analyzes the negative
consequences of exchange rate deregulation and free capital flows, creating an unstable
environment for local and international investments in the energy sector. Third, this section covers
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the Argentina-Chile gas pipeline that played a significant role during the Macri administration,
allowing Argentina to expand its exports capabilities to Chile and the Pacific. Finally, this chapter
elaborates on a policy that incentives financial instrument to allow companies from the private
sector to connect with the local capital markets
BARRIL CRIOLLO

As this research mentioned in previous sections, the barril criollo is a policy that decouples
domestic oil prices with international markets. Its history goes to the aftermath of the 2001
Argentine crisis. In 2002, former President Eduardo Duhalde encountered an energy sector with
the lowest activity and highest levels of idle capacity. In this context, Argentina decided to set an
internal oil price over the international reference that worked as a subsidy for oil production. The
industry's subsidy is the spread between the global and the barril criollo fixed price that the
producer delivers into the domestic market. The barril criollo is only an incentive to ensure the
production to supply chain, and all administrations implemented from Duhalde to Alberto
Fernandez. However, each government added changes such as fines if producers did not hit
production targets or more State interventions to condition producers' access to international
markets.

As this study mentioned before, the origin of this policy started after the Argentine 2001 crisis.
However, administrations rollover this policy as an easy way to promote producers' investments.
The first critique of the barril criollo is related to its financial sustainability. Since it is also an input
to produce other commodities such as soy, oil is one of the most influential commodities. Oil is an
input for fertilizers, logistics, and energy, which are all critical drivers of commodity prices99. Since
oil prices have a very intense positive correlation to other commodities that Argentina exports,
there is no natural hedge for the government payments to producers. As this research covered in
chapter 1, Argentina has a significant dependence on commodity exports to attract hard currency
to the economy. When oil prices are down because of the barril criollo, the government subsidizes
production to encourage oil supply. In other words, they cover the spread between the current price
and the stated barril criollo price. Naturally, this fiscal effort occurs when soy and corn are also
stressing budget accounts. In summary, when commodities are down, Argentina faces a vicious
circle that destabilizes fiscal and monetary balances.
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The barril criollo is framed in an economy with high levels of government intervention. When
prices are high, and there is no need to incentivize production paying over the international price,
the State subsidizes the retail sector to soften energy prices for the population. In this case,
Argentina enjoys a high inflow of hard currency when commodity prices are high. However, since
the demand in the domestic market is vastly more significant than energy exports when oil and gas
prices are high, the hard currency produced by exports does not offset the subsidies to keep retail
prices. Consumer subsidies for gas and electricity also pressured the Argetine fiscal balance. In
other words, the energy policies have serious inconsistencies as regards financial sustainability.

Different administrations changed aspects of the barril criollo to encourage oil (and gas, because
the same policy applied for gas as well) production. One of the most significant corrections was
about the production levels. At first, the barril criollo incentivizes production through prices by
ensuring profitability despite international references. After that, however, legislation had trouble
regulating the energy supply despite prices. Moreover, producers had too much negotiation power,
and domestic transportation costs and other local characteristics conflicted with apparent profits in
cycles of highest demand. Therefore, regulators fixed policy dynamics setting a minimum delivery
to avoid production shortages

Argentine Employment in Well Exploration and Production, Exploration, and Intl Oil Px, 2011-2018

Year
Employment
Employment Growth
Oil well exploration
International Oil Px

2011
52,403
77
102.4

2012
54,979
4.92%
98
105.9

2013
57,961
5.42%
83
102.3

2014
63,758
10.00%
77
96

2015
66,670
4.57%
70
45.3

2016
62,419
-6.38%
71
35.4

2017
58,045
-7.01%
68
36

Source: Energy Secretary, Ministry of Economy. Oil Pricing from Reuters.

The table Argentine Employment in Well Exploration and Production, Exploration, and Intl Oil
Px, 2011-2018 shows the little effect the barril criollo had in employment and oil well exploration
with low international prices. Furthermore, employment in the sector fell 5.61%, and the oil well
exploration 44.15%.

The barril criollo policy is one of many in the energy sector dynamics. The government knows that
producers are also interested in export taxes and the availability of the hard currency after
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2018
60,180
3.68%
43
66.1

international trade. Moreover, transportation costs and wages are also important factors that have
their own legislation network articulating the most convenient ecosystem for corporations, unions,
and the sector development.

Apart from incentives, the market players can forecast federal budgets stress. Companies project
policy sustainability and its effects at a macroeconomic level. As experience showed in Argentina,
big corporations delay or suspend infrastructure investments in volatile economic environments.
EXCHANGE RATE LIBERATION AND FREE CAPITAL FLOW

The capital flow policies are key drivers in financial development for emerging markets. Anton
Korinek researched how regulations and externalities affect capital flow policies in countries like
Argentina. In his paper Regulating capital flows to emerging markets: An externality view for the
Journal of International Economics, Korinek warned about the vulnerabilities and effects that errors
on free capital flow policies could cause in developing economies. Capital flows externalities differ
by order of magnitude depending on the state-contingent payoff profile of the flows. Those with
procyclical payoffs, such as foreign currency debt, generate substantial negative externalities
because they lead to large repayments and contractionary exchange rate depreciations during
financial crises. Therefore, forecasts on regulation effects are strategic to anticipate negative
impacts in the economy100. Otherwise, the capital outflow and falling exchange rates cycle
amplifies, and the currency value gets out of control like in Argentina from 2015 to 2019 when the
USD/ARS went from 14.57 to 73.5 in its blue-chip F.X. rate101.
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Financial amplification effects

Source: Anton Korinek. Regulating capital flows to emerging markets:
An externality view, Journal of International Economics.

As Chapter 1 covered Argentina's macroeconomic performance, exchange rate and free capital flow
were crucial to promote the proper context for investments. However, this section looks for the
direct impacts of these policies on leading firms and regulators. As Argentina relaxed exchange
rate restrictions in 2016, companies balanced hard currency positions to reduce F.X. risks. The
exchange rate liberation and free capital flow shock occurred because changes were abrupt. Firms
rebalanced pesos for U.S. dollars freely, without ordering time or quantity. Consequently, the
demand for hard currency became a big wave that increased devaluation pressure, and no buyer
wanted to be the last holder of Argentine pesos.

Before 2015, Argentina had very limited access to hard currency because the peso was pegged at
the wrong level and there were strong capital controls. Moreover, the Kirchner administration also
limited firms' exports by asking them to exchange their dollars from exports within weeks. Indeed,
no firm could save U.S. dollars because of restrictions in F.X. markets, and many enterprises
hedged currency risk with sovereign and sub-sovereign bonds linked to U.S. dollars or issued in
hard currency. In this context, energy companies had incentives to keep inventories and hedge
futures' prices. Additionally, companies also bought real estate properties as value reserves. Since
the hard currency was not allowed to easily get out of the economy, firms did not have incentives
to recapitalize profits on subsidiaries. After the liberalization of the exchange market, capitals
outflows were free to go, and firms paid dividends, inter-company debt, or any structure that
allowed them to fly funds out of the country102. Those capital outflows weakened the domestic
currency, and as the Argentine peso devaluated, companies increased the capital repatriation to
headquarters or foreign accounts.
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The lesson about this policy was not its core concept but the execution timing. Companies
accumulated profits for a long time, but the government restricted most options except reinvesting,
so the private sector found different solutions to park capital in Argentina. In this context, the F.X.
restrictions lift caused an overdemand of hard currency to move out the profits mentioned above.
Unfortunately, the government did not have enough tools and liquidity to manage this exit. As a
result, Argentina suffered an extensive disruption outlook due to a wrong planning on how capital
could flow in and out of the economy.
ARGENTINE-CHILE GAS PIPELINE FOR NATURAL GAS

Argentine and Chilean trade relations and shared investments were always complex. After the near
war in 1978, the Beagle Channel Resolution dispute in 1984 opened the way for improved relations
between both countries103. Chile was interested in importing cheaper natural gas, and Argentina
had a significant opportunity to promote natural gas exports. In this context, the main project on
the table was the GasAndes pipeline, which planned to run directly across the Andes into Santiago,
tapping into an existing Argentine pipeline extending north of the Neuquén gas fields from which
the gas would originate.

Before 1990, when the governments of Chile and Argentina prematurely called for international
bids on the gas pipeline project between the two countries, the project had funding limitations.
Investors initially stayed away primarily because neither the rules for deciding among competitive
offers nor those guiding the project's operation after construction were clear104. When the Gas
Interconnection Protocol (1991) stipulated that gas exports from Argentina would be subject to a
maximum level, and Chile could only import gas from the Neuquén Basin, investments rectified
their course by fixing trade uncertainties105. In 1991, a consortium of Argentinean, Chilean,
Canadian firms, and state agencies developed a protocol for a pipeline project meant to provide
cheaper gas to Chile. The feasibility study concluded in 1994, and the pipeline started working in
1997106. The infrastructure needed significant spending, but it significantly reduced regional supply
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chain costs because of the logistics in Patagonia. A lack of pipeline capacity slowed the
development of Argentina's giant shale plays in the natural gas market.

Argentine Natural Gas Trade, 1997-2019, billion cubic feet per day

Source: US Energy Information Administration from Energy Secretary, Ministry of Economy, Argentina.

As the chart Argentine Natural Gas Trade shows, Argentina was a net exporter of natural gas, and
GasAndes had a significant influence since most of the export went to Chile from 1998 through
2007. Nevertheless, Chile started looking for energy substitution because Argentina had trouble
delivering after 2006 during its energy crisis.

As Carlos Huneeus commented in his work: Argentina and Chile, the gas conflict, and the
Argentine domestic political factors, political factors led the Argentinian government of President
Nestor Kirchner to reduce exports of natural gas to Chile and increase its price through new export
taxes. For Chile, the export restrictions affected its economy because its energy matrix was not
diversified, and it relied highly on the projected natural gas from Argentina. (Professor) (Carlos)
Huneeus explained that the main reason that provoked the failure of the Argentine-Chile GasAndes
pipeline was the domestic political unpredictability of the Argentine government. In 2005-07,
Nestor Kirchner prioritized domestic policy over international agreements or trade relations. Before
the 2001 crisis, Argentina had a close and intense relationship with the United States and the world
since Carlos Menem actively promoted market-oriented policies, globalization, and the
Washington Consensus. After the Argentine crash, public opinion blamed Menem’s polices for
Argentine misfortune. So, the narrative consolidated full of resentment to any globalized economy
after the crisis. Indeed, in 2006, the political narrative in power blamed international markets and
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competition as the roots of financial collapse107. There was no doubt that Kirchner would always
prioritize domestic issues over international relations. Moreover, when Argentina had difficulties
delivering energy to its domestic markets, the agreement with Chile was the primary target.

(Professor Carlos) Huneeus used other examples to understand the relationship between Argentina
and the region in that period. In 2005, there was a remarkable conflict with Uruguay and the
Mercosur during the planning of a pulp plant installation in the River Plate. Argentina was lobbying
to have the pulp plan in their soil, but Uruguay offered conditions that were more convenient.
Therefore, investors decided to move on with Uruguay, but Argentina stepped into its way. The
Kirchner administration threated Uruguay with economic sanctions to give up the opportunity.
Argentina's behavior within its regional partners greatly influenced the failure of many public
policies that Argentina pursued. The government lost track of future opportunities because it looked
for straightforward solutions to domestic affairs even if it cannibalized relations with neighbors.

The two big reasons that pushed this policy to tragedy were a lack of economic planning and a
chaotic administration of foreign affairs. On the one hand, lack of economic planning may produce
the energy crises in Argentina and post exports restrictions to Chile. However, Argentina did not
open the game to more players, the sector faced a real lack of competitiveness, and the Chilean
market was lost. One hypothetical solution could imply importing energy for the domestic demand
and keep exporting to Chile to ensure the market share in the long run. Moreover, Argentina knew
that hurting a trade relation with Chile would trigger mistrust for joint ventures requiring massive
investments. Short-minded decision-making and unpredictability hurt the Argentine economy for
decades, and the GasAndes pipeline for natural gas was not the exception.
CAPITAL MARKETS, BOND ISSUING, AND SUBSECTION K FOR INFRASTRUCTURE

U.S. Federal Reserve economist David Alan Aschauer researched the positive relationship between
infrastructure investment and economic performance. He asserted infrastructure has a positive
direct contribution to growth by cumulative and indirect capital gains because it improves
productivity for other capital investments and facilitates access to education and health, especially
for low-income sectors108. During the 90s, Argentina's public investment in infrastructure was low
(between 1 to 2% of GDP). In the 90s, in the context of privatizations, main private investments in
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infrastructure went to energy, water, and telecommunication; however, governments did not control
quality and investment size. During the decade after the 2001 crisis, the government was the leading
actor for infrastructure investments. Argentina chose to freeze public services tariff in energy and
transportation, and many private companies faced enormous price disruptions and depended more
on the central government and subsidies.

According to the G-20 Global Infrastructure Hub (GIH), Argentina would require an annual
average of 4.5% of its GDP in infrastructure investments or 42 billion until 2040 to unlock its
economy to a consistent 3% annual growth. The biggest infrastructure gap in Argentina is in
highways, energy, and railways109.

A critical factor for infrastructure investments is financing. However, the Argentine banking system
does not have the proper framework and liquidity. Loans do not have the convenient interest rate,
size, and maturity suitable for infrastructure development. First, the banking system equity level in
2016 was 3.8% of GDP, and the credit stock to the private sector was 15% of the GDP. Second,
most of the deposits in banks are short-term allocations (45d). Third, after the 2008-9 crisis, the
banking regulations tightened to favor liquid investments with low risks reducing financing to
capital investments. In other words, the banking system does not have the structure to finance the
infrastructure that Argentina requires.

The infrastructure investment profile requires a long-term horizon, and pension funds may absorb
a reasonable size of this need. In Argentina, the Anses110 is responsible for the portfolio
management of the FGS (Fondo de Garantia de Sustabilidad, or Sustainability Guarantee Fund),
the biggest institutional fund in the country due to the nationalization of the pension system in 2008.
Thus, Argentina incentivized infrastructure type of investments through offering "subsection K"
bonds to institutional investors.

Local capital markets are crucial to offering liquidity and investments to domestic endeavors.
Moreover, domestic legislation is a great tool to encourage capital allocation to strategic economic
areas. In 2012, Cristina Kirchner's administration promoted infrastructure investment through
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capital markets by changing institutional funds legislation. The change reframed the structure of
the FGS and many insurance companies' portfolios, and the government imposed them to increase
their positions in infrastructure type of investments. The instrumentation consisted of a particular
kind of bond that required approval before issuing. Therefore, if firms investing in infrastructure
wanted to access financing through capital markets, they could apply to get under the "subsection
K" regulation. This policy created an 'imposed' demand for these instruments since portfolios had
to convey the norm to avoid fines. Because there were not enough instruments to meet the demand,
credit under this policy became insanely cheap111. YPF was the biggest beneficiary, making a great
idea, another State's source of financing.

The subsection was a great instrument to channel investment in infrastructure. However, the
execution of this policy raised many critics on the authorization process to issue these bonds. The
media questioned those beneficiaries because they were firms with close ties to the administration
at that time112.

Conceptually, Argentina found a great path to promote infrastructure investments through capital
markets. As this research mentioned at the beginning of this section, Argentina could not rely on
its banking system. So, regulating long-term horizon funds to allocate infrastructure bonds was a
great way to incentivize this type of investment. Nevertheless, three significant mistakes signed the
failure of this policy.

First, there was a critical mismatch of supply and demand for these bonds. The regulation did not
have enough planning, so the FGS, mutual funds, and insurance portfolios had to allocate a massive
amount of money in this type of investment, but there were not enough bonds to satisfy the demand.
This produced a price distortion and a sort of anti-economical portfolio management imposition113
because yields were overbought by a demand that could not find instruments to fulfill the new
regulation. The tradeoff between other allocations versus bonds subsection k was anti-economical.
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Second, there was a significant imbalance because the process for firms was not ideally transparent.
YPF received most of the investments under this incentive. Thus, the regulation worked as a new
financial source for public enterprises that required infrastructure instead of articulating the private
sector's demand. Since YPF had already captured significant financing from multiple sources, its
market capitalization became a tragedy because of inefficient debt and fragile management. As the
YPF Price Chart from 2011 to 2021 shows, all investment, direct transfers from the State, and
policy incentives that YPF received did not build value in the long term. It did not take advantage
of the enormous potential of Argentina's energy sector.

YPF Price Chart from 2011 2021

From 50.37 in Dec 31, 2011, to
4.7 in Dec 31, 2020 (-90.66%)

Source: Bloomberg, prices EOD, NYSE.

Third, Macri reversed the regulation instead of fixing it as another example of policy inconsistency.
During the Macri administration, access to international markets was the main priority; however,
the local market should be strengthened as credit expands and economic growth demand matches
liquidity114.
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COMMON POLICY MISTAKES AND CONFLICTING POLITICS

As this research briefly covered, Argentina had enormous problems in aligning policy, financial
resources, and political consistency. Essentially, every single policy covered in this section suffered
from Argentina's lack of economic planning115. As the Historical Fiscal Deficit (% of GDP) chart
shows that in the last 27 years, Argentina had a fiscal surplus in only 6 years, and it was only after
the 2001 crisis. In this context, the country experiences consistent financial stress that leads to the
inability to ensure policy sustainability. The Argentine government tends to execute its budget in a
very reactionary way. Each policy has a very narrow focus and does not have a long-term plan of
action for adverse effects.
Historical Fiscal Deficit (% of GDP)

Source: Ministry of Economy, Argentina.

There are some important lessons to highlight in the Argentine case for future policymaking and
guidelines. Strategic economic planning should be a priority, and it should be executed with a
holistic approach that considers detailed ramifications of government actions. For example, from
Menem to Alberto Fernandez, there was no responsible fiscal management. During the Nestor
Kirchner administration, the barril criollo promoted energy production and helped to deliver the
minimum amount of oil and gas into the economy. However, the surplus was a bounce from the
crisis, and it was only a temporary condition. The amount of fiscal spending never felt in contrast
with the income, and the surplus weakened year after year. The barril criollo spending had no
natural hedge in the national budget. No instrument or asset in the Argentine economy could cover
the gap between the barril criollo and the international price. One may think the Argentine treasury
team could use oil derivatives to protect the downside exposure, but that was not the case. As a
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result, the national account was left unbalanced and vulnerable. Considering that the Federal
government also subsidies the energy when international oil and gas prices are high, the financial
unsustainability in the sector is chronic.

The barril criollo policy started with Nestor Kirchner and lasted with Alberto Fernandez. Every
government continued it despite the big spending in subsidies for the retail sector too. Why?
"To widen the market and to narrow the competition is always the interest of the dealers. (...) The proposal of
any new law or regulation of commerce which comes from this order ought always to be listened to with great
precaution, and ought never to be adopted till after having been long and carefully examined, not only with the
most scrupulous but with the most suspicious attention. It comes from an order of men whose interest is never
the same as that of the public, who have generally an interest to deceive and even to oppress the public, and
who accordingly have, upon many occasions, both deceived and oppressed it116."
—

Adam Smith

The barril criollo has lobbyists in every stakeholder in the sector. This policy was an incentive for
producers after the 2001 Argentine crisis. No administration risked its political capital to take out
this benefit to producers, especially when they knew they already had a deficit to deliver energy in
the winter. After the 2001 crisis, Argentina also started direct transfers to people who did not have
formal employment. Since then, every government has kept these direct transfers because of the
political cost of stopping this benefit to the electoral voters. The barril criollo subsidy, like these
direct transfers, is a significant part of the deficit seen every year in the chart Historical Fiscal
Deficit (% of GDP). However, no government wants to be responsible for the cut because of the
fear of losing voters who are the last beneficiaries of these subsidies. Producers could cause energy
shortage. The barril criollo is an extraordinary source of income for companies in the sector. The
government may not be willing to handle the threat of insufficient supply to deliver energy in the
high-demand season.

During the Macri administration, Argentina made an abrupt capital flow liberation. The capital
accumulation that was ready to outflow the domestic economy was massive. The legislation did
not organize a sustainable structure to digest such a flow. The foreign exchange reacted so tragically
that there was no time to stop the flow in the chaos. Strategic economic planning did not play a role
in this policy. The essence of the free capital flow has a good point, and many countries proved its
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effectiveness in history117. However, managing the timing and progression of a political decision is
as important as the decision itself118. The effects of an erratic policy are usually very dangerous.
Argentina experienced this truth in the hard way. The exchange rate caused an enormous price
disruption that influenced every aspect of the Argentine economy and its relationship with trade.

Chapter 1 explained the monetary performance from 2015 to 2019, the exchange rate chaos affected
inflation and the supply of goods and services. In other words, the volatility compromised economic
growth and more legislation came up to fix new issues such as the supply of food, energy, and other
industrial inputs. Due to the initial free capital flow policy, devaluations and the price disruption in
the economy also affected Macri's main source of funding, international debt. Risk agencies
punished Argentine credit score due to economic volatility and the weakness of its currency.
Therefore, Argentina had to afford a more expensive interest rate than the region.

As the research judges the lack of economic planning and financial unsustainability in the barril
criollo policy, the free capital flow policy lacks economic reading. Free capital flow policy tends
to be included in the negotiation with corporate and institutional investors to regain access to
international markets. However, the damages to the economy are so deep that the role of strategic
economic planning could avoid a different outlook for Argentina in 2015-2019.

For the binational gas pipeline to export gas to Chile, the main lessons for Argentina are the
importance of trade with regional partners and the message Argentina sends to the market and its
players. For Argentina, a country with a cyclical crisis every so often because of its lack of ability
to generate hard currency and control its fiscal spending, trade relations with other nations,
especially with neighbors, must be a priority. Pipelines require massive investments, and
infrastructure financing always involves multilateral organizations such as the World Bank or the
InterAmerican Development Bank. In this case, Argentina stopped exporting gas to Chile after only
10 years of pipeline use. This fact speaks about the lack of financial planning and the inability to
sustain trade in the long run. After this track record, Argentina seeds a significant mistrust in Chile
and future countries that may be interested in doing business in Argentina.
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Vaca Muerta's energy potential opened the door to many countries that are net buyers of oil and
gas. Brazil is one of them; the biggest economy in South America has already raised its interest to
install a 1430-kilometer pipeline from Argentina to Brazil. The project's cost was forecasted in the
range of US$ 3.7 to 5 billion in 2020119. There are significant obstacles to the pipeline's
development, including financing challenges on both sides of the border, lack of interest from
Petrobras (Brazil's state-owned oil company), potentially insufficient Brazilian demand, and
Brazil's ability to obtain natural gas from other sources, including Bolivia and the country's own
offshore gas fields120. Furthermore, Brazil could also have concerns about Argentina's track record
with Chile if they go ahead with the Vaca Muerta-Brazil pipeline.

During the 'subsection K' bonds initiative from 2012 to 2015, Cristina Kirchner's administration
promoted infrastructure through domestic capital markets, which was a strategic solution to develop
financing for those projects with a long-term horizon. However, the firm that issued the most was
YPF (after the nationalization), which can be translated as a covered source of State financing.
Because the regulation did not plan the demand of a very limited amount of bonds in the market,
'subsection K' debt became very cheap, and investors did not have an economic incentive to allocate
capital into those bonds except the obligation by law. This case exemplifies how a very interesting
policy can sink if the design and execution are not well developed. First, a lesson from this mistake
should consider creating a progressing demand after carefully analyzing how the supply would
structure its projects and financing. Second, there should be an atomized pool of firms with
infrastructure financing demands, not just YPF. Capital markets are an excellent tool for financing,
but the State should guide efforts for a better and more robust domestic source of funding instead
of imposing on investors what to buy through regulation121.

In all policies, there is a clear political influence that significantly impacts the weak economic
performance of the policies mentioned above. The lack of economic planning seems to be a
common denominator in solutions proposed and executed on the go by administrations that are
more interested in content problems until the next election rather than fixing the core dysfunction.
The Argentine government widely avoids collateral damage analysis. Furthermore, international
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relations do not have sufficient political weight, and electoral voters are always the unique focus—
the narrow interest in policymaking design and execution questions political credibility.

The best way to start building a long-term solution for Argentina is a political agreement between
the entire political spectrum that sets a common strategy to work the strategic affairs such as
inflation, fiscal balance, and economic development. In that way, policymaking would be more
consistent and predictable. Moreover, every administration would follow a guideline to ensure the
fundamental economic performance, and each presidency could promote its policymaking without
risking institutions and basic financial stability.
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CHAPTER 6: POLICYMAKING GUIDELINES
TO BOOST ARGENTINA AND ITS ENERGY SECTOR

Argentina's energy sector does not only need regular infrastructure investments, but also a stable
business environment that could attract and incentivize firms with capital resources and know-how
to increase competition and participation. Nevertheless, historically, Argentine policymaking as
regard economy has not been consistent and it caused the sector's economic development to be
unsteady, and hence negatively influenced the economic development of Vaca Muerta.

In 1962, Robert A. Mundell published the paper The Appropriate Use of Monetary and Fiscal
Policy for Internal and External Stability, which researched how to deal with problems to achieve
domestic economic stability and balance of payment equilibrium. Mundell considered intervening
in exchange rates and imposing trade control as inadvisable. However, he also pointed out the
importance of an effective classification of macroeconomic problems, meaning that a monetary
problem (like inflation) should not be approached with fiscal policy122. This classification is
relevant because Argentina has exceptional financial vulnerability and macroeconomic imbalances
that are far from solved, and the government is committed to using fiscal tools to solve monetary
problems, such as inflation, as this study will explain ahead.
In the last decades, the country has not decoded the problems of high inflation, negative balance of
payments, high unemployment, fiscal deficit, excessive bureaucracy, inefficient state companies,
and unproportioned size of the government compared to the private sector. Finding solutions for
such a dysfunctional economy has not been easy. For example, after reporting a 7.5% inflation in
the food and beverage account during its February monthly report (2022), the Argentine Secretary
of Domestic Commerce, Feletti, referred to the inflation (which is more than 50% annually) as a
problem that has its roots in the speculators from the private sector123. Indeed, firms may adjust
prices due to inflationary expectations; however, the government's decision-making lies in
believing that inflation is caused by speculators rather than the Argentine Central Bank printing
money to finance ( the) Treasury spending. It is valuable to remark that Feletti's comments are not
isolated from other government officials. President Alberto Fernandez pointed out the same concept
in many interviews. However, this is not a problem in the current administration only. Cristina
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Kirchner and Mauricio Macri also used quantitative easing to finance government activities while
fighting inflation with price controls. Inflation is a nightmare for Argentina's economic stability,
and designing and executing the right policy to reduce it is a requirement to unlock the energy
sector's potential.

Argentine inflation is a significant difficulty that made financial planning impossible. Moreover,
significant infrastructure investments will not occur if inflation is not solved. Therefore, despite the
economic opportunity, forecast costs and other risks are very hard to measure with the current
inflation levels, which are expected to hit 60% by the end of 2022, according to the leading
economic consulting firms124.
INFLATION AND PRICE CONTROLS

In the book Forty Centuries of Wage and Price Controls: How Not to Fight Inflation, Schuettinger
and Butler studied inflation and history from the ancient world to the US in 1970-78. So, they
explained that wage and price controls have been ineffective as cures for inflation throughout
history. Moreover, understanding the causes of inflation is essential. Argentina had a long and
painful history of failure and ineffectiveness. As Schuettinger and Butler researched, controls may
be able to suppress the symptoms of
inflation, but the evidence shows that they are not a cure for the disease itself. Furthermore, the
authors of Forty Centuries of Wage and Price Controls stated three underlying conditions for
inflation that match perfectly with the case of Argentina. First, when aggregate expenditures expand
faster than the increase in the supply of goods and services, the expansion allows and encourages
a rising price level. Second, the expansion in aggregate demand can be generated by increased
government spending or by a cyclical upswing in private demand. Again, where this expansion is
greater than the expansion in the commodity supply, there is support in rising price levels. Finally,
these increases in demand and expenditure can occur only when the supply of money in the
economy is larger than the demand for money balances. In other words, as Milton Friedman said:
"Inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon." In addition, Friedman's views also
referred to inflation as a trigger to market inconsistency:
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"An unanticipated change is very different. Firstly, the unpredictability of prices will make
it difficult for producers to invest rationally and will generate doubt and uncertainty.
Hiring will therefore tend to be diminished. Secondly, a volatile price level shortens the
optimum length of unindexed labor commitments. In a volatile situation, employers will be
much less likely to hire labor for a long period at a fixed wage, because of the risks that
prices will fall while wages and other costs will continue to rise. An adverse effect on
employment will be the result."

Taking Friedman's comments, Schuettinger and Butler articulate that the effect of controls will
confuse market prices and economic performance even further. The government sets prices for a
wide range of services, ⸺postal services, energy, and many more⸺, and regulates even more.
Under inflation, they take it upon themselves to control nearly all prices, either by explicit controls
or by "voluntary" restraint. The resulting inability of the price system to guide economic activity
leaves a given level of inflation compatible with rising unemployment. If employment becomes the
principal end of government policy (as it does in Argentina), then inflation could rise higher and
higher125. Unfortunately, Argentina fits perfectly into this model. It has been trying to fight inflation
with price controls since the 40s. Argentina never stops printing money to finance the Treasury. It
does not perform an effective classification of the economic policy instruments for internal and
external stability. The right way to stop inflation is to reduce or eliminate the rate of monetary
expansion, but Argentine politicians use that policy to build power for electoral purposes.

The price controls story is very entrenched in the energy sector. For years, Argentine policymakers
have regulated energy (a significant part of the economy) based on the cost-of-production theory
of value because of the understanding that Argentine natural resources constitute a crucial element
when imposing pricing in the supply chain126. Therefore, the Argentine government calculates a
"fair" cost of production and regulates the market by setting maximum prices and other types of
regulations. Since YPF is a State-controlled business, the government understands that it could
develop the energy market under those premises because it has the know-how and the strategic
instrumentation to do so. However, despite modern interpretation of the cost-of-production theory

125 Robert L. Schuettinger and Eamonn F. Butler. Forty Centuries of Wage and Price Controls: How Not to Fight
Inflation. The Heritage Foundation. Washington D. C. 1979.
126 Jude Webber. Guillermo Moreno: Argentina's lethal weapon. Financial Times. Archived from the original on Nov
23, 2011.
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of value or cost-determined-prices ideas from Yoshinori Shiozawa127 or Michał Kalecki128, the
effect of capital markets, globalization, and other subjective aspects of pricing exposed the
weaknesses of the cost-determined-prices theory, and a different theory of value proved to work
better in understanding the setting of prices and its more direct effects.

Consequently, Carl Menger contributed to developing the theories of marginalism and marginal
utility that exposed that prices explain costs and not the other way around. "Both sides gain from
exchange", commodity markets have vast experience in the effects of prices as an economic driver.
Commodity prices have a major impact on the demand for inputs and machinery.

Current Argentina's views on cost-determined-prices theory are the foundation of its energy
policies. Indeed, the Ministry of Economy models price caps in the supply chain and designs
subsidies based on the costs reports made with information from YPF or IEASA. In the Argentine
government narrative, the State-owned companies compete with domestic and international
players, but in practice, they play an active role in creating price distortion in market inefficiency
because the Treasury chronically subsidizes them.

In Argentina, the benefits of reconsidering Manger's views on pricing are relevant for energy
policymaking. First, Argentina is very vulnerable to the effects of international prices. Argentina
does not have full autonomy in producing-establishing upstream, midstream, and downstream
processes, and installing (and maintaining) that infrastructure implies importing goods and services
from main suppliers. Those suppliers price their goods and services according to the supply and
demand of oil & gas. Moreover, the developed economies have more priority than Argentina. This
fact influences the pricing as well, consequently, Russian sanctions will make it more complicated
for Argentina to import gas in the southern winter. In addition, credit is a tool that Argentina cannot
access easily due to its credit ratings129. As Galluccio mentioned in an interview for Bloomberg in
2019, Vista Oil & Gas does production planning according to international energy prices modeling
and the financial resources available for expanding operations130. If domestic prices are not stable,
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the private sector's production and investments planning get harder. Secondly, setting a cost of
production with high and persistent inflation makes the cost-determined-prices theory almost a
nightmare to organize prices in an economy. Wages and other domestic prices would require a type
of safe margin to avoid profitability risks because agents do not have certainty about future
outlooks. Third, commodity markets are highly developed, and they have different types of
derivatives, deep liquidity, and vast leverage mechanisms that allow companies to make predictable
models according to what they want to produce and sell at a certain future price. Consequently,
energy players reduce market volatility and other risks by trading derivatives. Fourth, geopolitical
risks are not priced in a cost-determined-prices theory. In cases such as the Russian invasion of
Ukraine that unlocked an orchestration of sanctions on Russia that impact energy prices, Argentina
has a massive bottleneck on its energy production because of supply chain management issues and
collateral effects of scarce energy in the West.
Oil and Gas Supply Chain Flowchart

Source: Global Cables and Cable Accessories for Oil and Gas. Blog.

Since the re-nationalization of YPF and Vaca Muerta's investments in 2012, Argentine policies did
not manage to cover the energy deficit in the Argentine winter. Moreover, price controls
disincentivized market profitability for the private sector as the government pretended to have full
control of the means of production. Under current economic policies that cannot solve high
inflation, Vaca Muerta's opportunities face a glass ceiling in the middle of an energy crisis and a
new global reorganization of trade.
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Argentina's fiscal imbalances have explained most of its crisis and debt defaults in history131.
Reviewing Mundell's views on The Appropriate Use of Monetary and Fiscal Policy for Internal
and External Stability, the author suggests that the only way to solve the fiscal deficit is to alleviate
or reverse public spending. Therefore, the challenge for Argentina is to eliminate the deficit and
achieve economic growth, which is difficult and, for some economists, almost impossible under
current circumstances. As this research mentioned in chapter 1, Argentina has one of the highest
tax burdens globally132, which means that there is significant informal economic activity133. The
Argentine informal sector does not collect any tax and increases the pressure on the exchange rate
for hard currency (an informal exchange rate or blue exchange rate134 from pesos to US dollars is
offered to the informal economy in what Argentines call cuevas). Additionally, the National budget
could have cut spending in different areas without exposing social costs (such as aid packages to
those unemployed or suffering from poverty). Privilege pensions are 0.7% of the GDP and are
distributed mainly to the political arc (diplomats, former presidents, judges, etc.). Direct transfers
to State companies also represent 0.9% of the GDP (Aerolineas Argentina needs 700 million dollars
a year from the Treasury to stay active, and it has a monopoly in Argentinean skies because the
regulator has intervened in the pricing of flight tickets as well. The Argentinean Federal
government also has 21 ministries. Those 21 include the Ministry of Women´s Affairs, Sports and
Tourism, Culture, and others that can be downgraded to secretaries or paused for a future with
better financial conditions in a state of emergency. Despite adjustments in the federal budgets,
Argentina's solution is economic growth, and to achieve it, policies need to spend sustainably.

Once Argentina has fixed its macroeconomic imbalances, especially inflation, the energy sector
can rethink its structure. As this research studied before, the barril criollo tries to incentivize
production when prices are down. However, when prices go high, the barril criollo keeps playing
a role that makes the market less attractive than other options worldwide. Therefore, policymakers
may consider other options to promote production rather than price intervention.

Tanzi, Vito. “Argentina, from Peron to Macri: An economic chronicle”. Jorge Pinto Books, 2018.
The Global Competitiveness Report. Insight Report. World Economic Forum. 2015-2016.
133 In 2020, the percentage of informal employment in Argentina stood at 46.4 percent of the total employed population.
134 Blue Dollar AKA Dolar Blue or unofficial dollar is parallel dollar rate of USD in Argentina. This is the cost of buying
and selling a physical dollar bill in a cueva, or clandestine financial house in Buenos Aires. This is the best price you’ll
get if you are buying or selling physical bills, and the transaction is done with no involvement of any governmentsanctioned or licensed entity.
131
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LONG TERM VISION

Since Vaca Muerta became a priority, the government signed Executive Orders (EO) that targeted
a certain amount of investments so that firms could export 20% of the production without any
export tax. In 2013, the EO 929/13 gave Chevron and Petronas concessions for 25 years of
exclusivity with another ten-year extension option, with the government's commitment to a stable
taxation framework. In 2014, the government reduced the target from 1000 to 250 million in
investments to access the above benefits135. One option could be changing the concession
agreement structure for firms producing in Vaca Muerta. Argentina could offer shorter concessions
similar to the US (leases), which are also matched to drill permits for two years. In order to apply
for such permits producers have to provide specific information such as operators’ identification
and resources, among other details.136 In the US, firms lease locations, and companies have to drill
to secure space in different places. The shorter period and production targets incentivize producers
to maintain a target production to secure its area and ensure the location rollover after the permit
maturity. Therefore, the policy of restructuring concession may encourage competition to unlock
Vaca Muerta's potential.

Despite pipelines and LNG technology in ports, another aspect of the Argentine energy supply
chain that is strategic to unlock Vaca Muerta's potential is energy storage. Installing depository
infrastructure is highly important to develop the local market and play a significant role in
international trade. Repositories allow producers to access anti-cyclical opportunities and leverage
activities due to credit collateralizations. Moreover, storage investments rely heavily on finances
rather than operations since loans will consider the valuation of the infrastructure itself and the
projected occupancy ratio. Consequently, the Argentine credit score is, once again, a major
component of energy policies that boost Vaca Muerta's development.

Another option for Argentina is creating an economic program with sustainable financial conditions
that do not increase taxes and rearrange public spending differently than it is currently structured.
In this way, new regulations would not threaten the firms' financial statements. For example, in
April 2022, the Alberto Fernandez administration promoted an initiative to tax (the) 'unexpected
profit.' In the bill, the government looked to tax firms that make more than 100 million dollars.

135

David Mottura. La forma de Vaca Muerta en sus 42 concesiones. Mas Energia Neuquen. Feb 4, 2022. Link:
https://mase.lmneuquen.com/vaca-muerta/la-forma-vaca-muerta-sus-42-concesiones-n883339
136 US Department of Interior, Bureau of Land Management. Link: https://www.blm.gov/programs/energy-andminerals/oil-and-gas/operations-and-production/permitting/applications-permits-drill
82

However, more tax pressure on the energy sector that needs to invest massive capital and ensure
returns is also detrimental to the long-term vision of what Vaca Muerta could become.

Argentina must focus spending only on the necessary, export as much as it can, and restructure its
macroeconomics to offer a stable framework for all the productive agents that participate in the
economy. As Argentina has experienced in its economic history since 1929, macro imbalances
cannot be postponed if achieving economic development is a priority, especially fiscal deficit. The
economic potential can only be unlocked if Argentina pursues competition and macroeconomic
stability as its principal values.
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CHAPTER 7: PERSPECTIVES FOR THE ARGENTINE
POLICYMAKING AND ENERGY SECTOR

This chapter evaluates current global trends and perspectives for Argentina and Vista Oil and Gas.
For Argentina, the research involves the study of domestic and international risks that threaten its
institutional governance and macroeconomic stability. For Vista, the study proposes the necessary
steps to solidify business opportunities and tackle credit market vulnerabilities due to quantitative
tightening.
QUANTITATIVE TIGHTENING137 (QT) AND FED FUND RATES

As global inflation becomes a more problematic situation for the US and the global economy, the
Fed has decided to pull back the monetary expansion that saved the global credit system in the
months of Covid. Moreover, soaring energy and food inflation triggered by the War in Ukraine and
supply chain breakdowns in the wake of Covid have complicated things even worse for the Fed.

Fed Funds Target Rate, 2000-2022

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Data.

Vista Oil & Gas will need funds for expansionary CAPEX plans and increase production. Part of
that financing is debt, and an increase in global interest rates implies that Vista will have a serious
rise in financing costs in the near future. Moreover, there is no reason to think that global interest
137
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rates are just going to be high only in the short term. As seen in the retail sector, where the March
2022 consumer credit report from the Federal Reserve confirmed that any excess savings
accumulated by the US middle class are long gone, and in their place, Americans have unleashed
a credit card fueled spending spree138. Companies that do not have strong cash positions or strong
cash flows are next in line. Correlations in credit markets show that emerging companies get hit
worse because of the premium risk. Considering that Vista's main activities are in Argentina, which
has a very vulnerable financial track record, the financing complications in Argentina are far more
complex than in any other emerging market. Argentine corporate risk pays a premium over the
country's premium, and the national debt has been under a lot of stress recently.

In early 2022, Argentina and the IMF agreed to a new sovereign debt restructuring under conditions
like fiscal budget constraints, international reserves, limitations for Central Bank transfers to the
Treasury, and economic growth. However, the Fed's quantitative tightening stresses global credit
conditions and slows down economic growth by affecting the aggregated demand of money. In
other words, Argentina has less comfortable conditions than there were before when US interest
rates were near zero.

High-interest rates may drastically affect Vista Oil & Gas Prices if they cannot raise enough equity,
or their cash flow gets compromised due to operating costs or export restrictions. Therefore,
corporate debt will be an expensive funding source for a company that requires intense capital
allocation. Vista has a solid opportunity, but needs to be back with the proper policymaking to
achieve its goals.
INFLUENCE OF POPULISM VS LIBERALISM

Populist leaders' influence has been growing in numerous countries across the world. Populist
parties and politicians can be anywhere on the political spectrum. For example, the deceased former
president of Venezuela, Hugo Chávez, and the Podemos party in Spain have been labeled as
populists; however, both represent the right and left, respectively. Yet, increasing populist factions
today are veering towards the far right. Marine Le Pen in France and Viktor Orbán in Hungary,
amongst others, are trying to combine populism with anti-immigrant sentiments and authoritarian
ambitions139.
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Populists pitch themselves as true representatives of "the people", struggling to overcome some
"elite" who undermine "the people's" interest. Populism's first characteristic is to divide society
between a supposed broad interest and an establishment elite quelling it. A key feature of populism
as a "thin ideology" then is the idea of an elite working against broad majoritarian interests.
Populists can disagree on who the "elites" and "the people" are, given the fact that they tend to
occupy left and right spaces in politics, although it is remarkable how often they agree that
corporations are enemies. The opposite of populism is not elitism but pluralism — the idea that
multiple identities and interests can compete and coexist within a free society140.
Economic populism is, therefore, anti‐market. A healthy market economy is characterized by
individual choice(s,) voluntary trading and individuals pursuing their own self-interest(s.) Claiming
that a political representative of "the people" knows better how to achieve aggregate goals than a
free people erode any sort of limiting principle on government action. Populism practitioners tent
to imply there are big wins out there for "the people" available at no cost. Populists' policy programs
claim the elites deny "the people" something that the self-styled people's representatives can
deliver. Moreover, they claim they can do so without trade-offs, lost opportunities, and unintended
consequences141.

Economic populists are in favor of high fiscal spending and they prioritize short-term highly
measurable projects that target strong impact in elections. The rise of populism in Argentina has its
roots in President Juan Domingo Peron, who had an expansionary economic policy in his first term,
launching a 5-year plan in 1946. Moreover, Perón paid off Argentina's foreign debt using almost
half percent of gold and foreign assets holdings in the central bank from 1946 to 1948. After the
execution of this policymaking, the State suffered a significant increase in the intervention of many
strategic aspects of the economy and had fewer financial resources.
“El más urgente de los problemas de nuestra época (ya denunciado con profética lucidez por el
casi olvidado Spencer) es la gradual intromisión del Estado en los actos del individuo”.
⸺ Jorge Luis Borges, "Nuestro pobre individualismo" en Obras completas II, p. 37 142.
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"The most urgent of the problems of our time (already denounced with prophetic lucidity by the
almost forgotten Spencer) is the gradual interference of the State in the acts of the individual."
⸺ Jorge Luis Borges, "Our poor individualism” in Complete works

The Argentine current economic picture appears to be highly influenced by populist policies that
have the government as the principal economic agent, instead of as the organizer of economical
and institutional stability. The size of the State in Argentina is disproportioned compared to the
private sector. The government is the most active agent in the economy and its policy execution is
inefficient and corrupt. In Argentina, the current levels of poverty, fiscal deficits, tax burden, and
economic freedom resemble an economic tragedy that is hard to believe for those who are familiar
with the international economic history of the last century.

In the book The Man Versus the State, Herbert Spencer presented his work about government,
society, and freedom. He presented the risks of the States in times after feudalism. In Spencer's
criticism of the government's intervention, he explained that the State might concentrate a massive
amount of power in society. If institutions are not strong enough, the State may resemble structures
that are not express democracy and civil rights. "The function of Liberalism in the past was that of
putting a limit to the powers of kings. The function of true Liberalism in the future will be that of
putting a limit to the power of Parliaments." Argentina needs solid institutions to repair its
macroeconomic problems. Policymakers and politicians must prioritize all urgencies and establish
a hierarchy of needs. A new social order must take place in Argentina to reorganize its economy
and establish a sustainable framework that ensures financial stability and a friendly environment
for businesses.

THE WEAKNESS OF DEMOCRACIES TO EXERCISE
POWER IN EMERGING ECONOMIES: THE DANGER OF AUTOCRACIES

Emerging economies are characterized by complex socio-economic conditions and inconsistent
financial resources to recreate stability in the long term. Those developing countries have weaker
institutions than those from the developed world. Institutional theory emphasizes the influences of
the systems surrounding organizations that shape social and organizational behavior. Institutional
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forces affect organizations' processes and decision-making143. In the research Institutions,
institutional change, and economic performance, North argued that institutions provide the rules
of the game that structure human interactions in societies and that organizations are the players
bound by those formal and informal rules. The role of institutions in an economy is to reduce
transaction and information costs by reducing uncertainty and establishing a stable structure that
facilitates interactions144. In addition, in the publication The growth of the firm in planned
economies in transition: Institutions, organizations, and strategic choice, Peng and Heath argued
that the internal growth of firms in emerging economies is limited by institutional constraints145. In
other words, Vista Oil & Gas economic success is strongly attached to the stability and consistency
of Argentine institutions.

In recent years, weak democracies with dysfunctional economies have asked themselves if
democracy is the right model to frame governance and achieve economic development.
Consequently, many scholars have turned to other alternatives, and Daniel Bell was one of them
asking: Is Democracy the Least Bad Political System? In 1992, Francis Fukuyama called the "end
of history," when democracy finally triumphed over its rivals after the fall of the Berlin Wall
(communism). It is widely assumed that democracy is something that all rational individuals would
want if they could get it. In his 1968 work Political Order in Changing Societies, Samuel
Huntington argued that a strong political order was necessary for economic and social development.
He empathized with autocratic leadership, but he did not mean to justify dictatorship as a permanent
arrangement. Once the building blocks are in place, then the time is ripe for democracy, and further
delays are not justified from a moral point of view146.

In recent decades, two countries stood as non-democracies and achieved extraordinary economic
results. Those economies are China and Singapore. Both nations implemented meritocratic reforms
to improve political leadership quality starting from the mid-1960s in Singapore and the early 1980s
in China. As Daniel Bell, explains in The China Model: Political Meritocracy and the Limits of
Democracy, Singapore has achieved a stunning economic miracle and has not gone to war since
independence in 1965 because of a new way of understanding capitalism from a State level.

143

Scott. W, R. 1995. Institutions and organizations. Thousand Oaks. CA: Sage.
North, D. 1990. Institutions, institutional change, and economic performance. New York: Cambridge University
Press
145 Peng, M. W., & Heath. P. S. 1996. The growth of the firm in planned economies in transition: Institutions,
organizations, and strategic choice. Academy of Management Review, 21: 492-528.
146 Daniel A. Bell. The China Model: Political Meritocracy and the Limits of Democracy. Princeton University Press,
2015.
144

88

Countries should organize their economies first, even if that means going over other social
priorities. In the case of China, Daniel explains that the county has eradicated famine and has a
much better record on malnutrition than, say, democratic India147. In addition, Bell covered key
problems with electoral democracies: the tyranny of the majority, the tyranny of the minority, the
tyranny of the voting community, and the tyranny of competitive individualists. Those tyrannies
are imbalanced in electoral democracies that lack of strong institutions. When democracies do not
have the right means to control the State, imbalances create more problems, and the societies suffer
from an erratic government. Bell argued that autocracies like China and Singapore had set a new
example of a political system for emerging markets bringing economic prosperity and political
stability.

For Argentina, the Chinese and Singaporean cases did not go unnoticed. Latin America has a long
history of coups and nondemocratic governments. Although democracy is not an economic system,
many politicians in Latin America empathized with a central government managed by one autocrat
who can rule over legislation, the justice system, and the executive power. The desire for power
from politicians of weak and failed economies looks at models like China, Singapore, and, not long
ago, Russia, as countries that found the right way to govern and play an efficient role in modern
capitalism.
Political Regime, 2021
Based on the criteria of the classification by Luhrmann et al. (2018) and the assessment by V-Dem's experts

Source: OWID based on Luhrmann et al. (2018) and V-Dem (v12).
Note: The Chart tab uses numeric values ranging from 0 for closed autocracies to 3 for liberal democracies.
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Some autocracies had proved Fukuyama wrong when he referred to an endpoint of humankind’s
ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of
human governance148. In 1992, Francis Fukuyama argued that with the ascendancy of Western
liberal democracy—which occurred after the Cold War (1945–1991) and the dissolution of the
Soviet Union (1991)—humanity has reached "not just ... the passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such". Nevertheless, China and Singapore seem to achieve
socio-economic development and growth that many developed countries did not in the last two
decades. Since both economies had such a different shape in the 90s and their economic growth
has turned out to be extraordinary, many emerging economies are reconsidering western democratic
values as the just and appropriate governing model.

In 2010, Jorge Lanata (an Argentinean Journalist) interviewed Jim O'Neil, a former executive of
GS, in London. The journalist inquired O'Neil about the best environment for business in the 2000s.
The journalist specifically asked about O'Neil's experience: what was a better place to do business,
a democracy like the US where you have a distribution of powers to the degree that some rules can
change rapidly, or an autocracy, like China, where you only negotiate with an autocratic-centralized
authority to make a deal? O'Neil replied without hesitation: China149. Maintaining autocratic
political stability and a friendly and stable environment for business have been the foundations for
emerging to take people out of poverty and bring prosperity to a nation. China reshaped a new
system that seems to work so far.

Despite economic success, emerging countries cannot just adopt a new type of government that
conditions freedom of speech and limits human rights for economic development. However, the
political narrative can adapt slow changes to implement reforms that turn electoral democracies
into electoral autocracies. The most recent case in history in the Latin American region was
Venezuela with Hugo Chavez.
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Latin American Presidents from Argentina, Brazil in Venezuela, 2005.

Source: Agencia Brasil, 19 January 2006. Ph: Ricardo Stuckert/PR.
Note: The leaders of Venezuela, Hugo Chávez; Argentina, Nestor Kirchner; and Brazil, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva.

Argentina is no stranger to the dangers of autocracies. Despite its history of coups, administrations
have tried to influence reforms to control the justice system in recent years. However, the congress
limited populist reforms and bills, and social manifestations made the government back out from
autocratic initiatives such as a proposal of the executive power to democratize the justice system in
2013150. Moreover, Chavez's ties with the Kirchner administration always brought concerns about
Argentina's prospects and the so-called 'populist' government limit.

NEW ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES AS A CONSEQUENCE OF GEOPOLITICAL TENSIONS

For Argentina, getting its fiscal accounts in order and incentivizing economic freedom must
consider its place in the global economy. Argentina had a long path to rebuild trust in financial
markets, and as this research covered in chapter 3 with the Argentine-Chilean pipeline case,
Argentina needs to rebuild a trade track record and propose a sustainable economic activity in the
global supply chain. That is the reason why Vaca Muerta has such enormous potential. Energy is
getting an intense role in the new global order, and Argentina could solve its own current shortage
and generate the hard currency it needs through exports. However, domestic reorganization is just
a first step since Argentina has to find its place in international markets. The country has strong
agriculture, energy, and professional services sectors, but it has to plan mid- and long-term
strategies to develop core industries.
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The World's Oil and Gas, 2020
Energy trade that is seriously compromised
for the incoming years

Source: Aljazeera. Mapping the world's oil and gas pipelines. EIA, 2020.

Global energy trade is changing due to geopolitical tension between the West and Russia. Energy
prices went up not because of shortages but because of economic sanctions on Russia. Once again,
economic sanctions play a fundamental role in the new global order. The US and its allies had
imposed economic sanctions on Russia because of its invasion to Ukraine, and the West is looking
for alternative sources of energy and grain production. Another case of economic sanctions in
response to geopolitical tensions is the trade war between China and the US, which increased the
import tariff on Chinese products due to intellectual property claims. Economic sanctions have a
big effect on the global economy. They encourage protectionist policies and reorient the global
supply chain as countries look for new partners to avoid trading with those the system is punishing.
This new paradigm is a massive opportunity for Argentina, and its government should be actively
pitching for new businesses. However, choosing the right partner and standing on the right side of
history is a premise that Argentina had trouble working along in the past.

During WWII, despite Argentina being neutral for most of the duration of the war, the country had
strong ties to Nazi Germany, and President Peron had an enormous admiration for Mussolini, who
was the fascist leader in Italy. This ambivalent diplomacy had adverse consequences for Argentina.

The negative perception from the US was very unhelpful in negotiating an eventual
strategic role in the new global order. After the war, Argentina was excluded from the
foundational event of the IMF in the Bretton Woods Conference of July 1944.
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Consequently, Argentina was punished because the U.S. prohibited Europeans from using
Marshall Plan dollars to purchase Argentine products, which played a key role in
inaugurating the postwar era of prosperity and political stability in Western Europe. In that
case, Argentina lost a historic opportunity to increase exports and expand its markets
because of its international relations.

As it happened in the 40s and many other times in its history, Argentina did not forecast
the effects of diplomatic mistakes, and those consequences had a dramatic impact on its
socio-economic development. The exclusion of Argentina from the Marshall Plan can be
repeated in modern times. Just before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Argentina had a
diplomatic mission in China and Russia to strengthen trade and security relations. Despite
the pragmatic convenience of expanding trade, Argentina had a terrible timing and
unfortunate intention to do business with Russia right before more than 60% of the world
GDP started actively applying economic sanctions and proposing exploring new markets
as a repudiation of Russian actions in Ukraine.
Argentine has a new opportunity to attract investments for energy production, but it must ensure
delivery and efficiency to beneficiaries. Moreover, Argentina should also stop its ambivalence on
international affairs. Instead, it must play a pragmatic economic position that aligns with its
foundational values and prioritize economic development first.
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CONCLUSION

Argentinean has great potential; however, it is up to its people to rebuild its new foundations to
restore credibility, institutional accountability, and economic guidelines. Despite losses in
employment, household income, and education, Argentineans have some of the most remarkable
skills a society could have: Adaptability and resilience, which were forged under a chronic
economic downturn for decades.

Its private sector plays an enormous role in this turnaround. The private initiative must find the best
advantages and leverage opportunities not only in the domestic market but also in a global economy
where competition is already high and challenging. New geopolitical conditions must become
opportunities for private endeavors, and Argentinean firms must engage with the world not only
for exports but also to become more efficient, and adopt new technology.

Vista Oil and Gas and its business model should be considered an example of timing opportunity
and business structuring. Vista is an ideal business model in the private sector that is perfectly
compatible with the primary macroeconomic needs that Argentina currently has. Vista's operations
focus on Vaca Muerta, which has become a great tool for investors to channel investments to the
shale formation opportunity. The company has the potential to massively attract FDI to turn it into
energy production and infrastructure projects for gas distribution and transportation. Moreover,
Vista exports a large part of its production, making it a hard currency generator in an economy that
badly needs a genuine supply of dollars.

Neither Vista nor other firms in the private sector can succeed without the support and engagement
of the public sector. Firms need that the government tame inflation, keep the value of the peso
stable, and make proper public debt management in the long run. Without those considerations,
Argentina's businesses will always suffer from cyclical shocks that reduce its capacity to succeed
in the global markets.

Today, the international picture is facing many fronts. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has
impacted the global energy sector and increased inflationary pressures around the globe, especially
in Europe. The tension between Taiwan and China is scaling and creating new global order
scenarios of war and trade. Additionally, Covid-19 is still a liability for many economies that were
not well positioned in their fiscal picture. Under these circumstances, Argentina could easily face
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a scenario similar to the 80s, where global interest rates created more pressure than the country
already had, and Argentina and the Latin American region experienced what many remember as
the lost decade151. Threats to domestic economic recovery can become a nightmare under the
current systemic risk in the overall global economy.

Consequently, Argentina has a reduced margin of error if it is really considering a serious economic
turnaround in the near future. Opportunities are there, but it will take a massive effort from the
Argentine people to shift the current trend. In this line, having a great understanding of current
conditions and setting examples like Vista Oil and Gas is crucial for any plan for public and private
sector engagement

The Argentine experience with long stagflationary periods, which administrations try to heal by
expansionary policies that ran on deficits that made inflation even worse, is also an asset that, if
used correctly, can positively impact Argentina and the rest of the world. For example, the OECD
recently discussed the dilemma between public spending and inflation in its June 2022 report152.
Unfortunately, Argentina does not have a success story to share with the world but the experience
of an economy that suffered from misguided expansionary policies, price controls, and fiscal
deficits. For Argentina, embracing historical experiences and rectifying its fiscal deficits may help
the country reunite with the global community and find channels to cooperate with the region's
development. As this research showed in its introduction, the country has a historical legacy for
development domestically and its neighbors in the region. For Argentina, it is time to revisit
foundations and reconsider lessons for a better economic outlook.
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